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RESCUING CHILDREN FROM THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT:
THE CASE AGAINST MARITAL RESTRICTIONS ON ADOPTION AND ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTION1
by
RICHARD F. STORROW2
Much of the current cultural debate about marriage in the United States focuses on the need for 
children to be raised by heterosexual married couples.  In the current atmosphere, it is important 
to examine how marriage functions in contexts where parent-child relationships are determined 
by more than just genetics and marital presumptions.  This Article argues that the favoritism 
toward marriage in adoption and assisted reproduction relates neither to the purposes of 
marriage nor to child welfare.  Part I subjects marital restrictions on assisted reproduction to an 
interpretivist microscope, and Part II undertakes a comprehensive comparison of step-parent 
adoption and second-parent adoption.  Both Parts raise concerns that are further addressed in 
Part III’s look at how the contemporary marriage movement, in advocating for favored 
treatment of married couples at all levels of society, ultimately undermines the welfare of 
children whose best hope lies with parents for whom marriage is not an option. 
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INTRODUCTION
Much of the current cultural debate about marriage in the United States focuses on 
whether children need to be raised by heterosexual married couples.  On one side of the 
spectrum, the Human Rights Campaign urges policymakers to take note of the many same-sex 
couples who are raising children and are doing so well.  On the other side, marriage-movement 
groups like the Family Research Council and Focus on the Family claim that society is imperiled 
whenever a child is not raised by a heterosexual married couple.3
3 See Margery Beck, Senators React to Advertisement, JOURNAL STAR (Omaha), June 29, 2004; 
James Dao, Legislators Push for State Action on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004; 
Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 
2004.
3In the current atmosphere, it is important to examine how marriage functions in contexts 
where parent-child relationships are determined by the state rather than through the application 
of natural-law principles.  One of these is adoption, where the state plays the primary role in 
naming new parents for an adoptable child.  Another is assisted reproduction, where traditional 
approaches to parentage often fail to identify the parents of a child born via unfamiliar methods 
of reproduction.  In both of these contexts, the state undertakes to assess whether those 
petitioning for a declaration of parentage are fit to be parents and whether the child’s being 
raised in the home they offer is in that child’s best interests.   
This Article argues that the favoritism toward marriage in adoption and assisted 
reproduction relates neither to the purposes of marriage nor to child welfare.  Part I subjects 
marital restrictions on access to assisted reproduction to an interpretivist microscope and 
concludes that using marriage as a gatekeeper in that context conflicts with the value our society 
places on consistency, neutrality and integrity in the law.  Part II begins with a comprehensive 
comparison assisted reproduction and adoption and then examines the role of the law in 
regulating step-parent adoption and second-parent adoption.  Part II criticizes in particular how 
marriage functions as a proxy for the parental fitness of individuals who seek to adopt their step-
children and reveals the wrongheadedness of the possible justifications for allowing marriage to 
play this role.  Part II concludes with an argument for harmonizing the law of step-parent and 
second-parent adoption.  Both Parts I and II raise concerns that are further addressed in Part III’s 
look at how the contemporary marriage movement, in advocating for favored treatment of 
married couples at all levels of society, ultimately undermines the welfare of children whose best 
hope lies with parents for whom marriage is not an option. 
4I.  MARRIAGE AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
Marriage has played a prominent role in the development of the law and policy that 
govern assisted reproduction.  The effect has been to restrict the use of assisted reproduction to 
those in socially sanctioned intimate relationships and to erect barriers to its use against those 
who are not.  While these barriers are no longer as salient in the artificial insemination context as 
they once were, they continue to exist and to be particularly prominent in the regulation of 
surrogacy.
A.  Marriage and Artificial Insemination
Whereas artificial insemination was once considered adulterous,4 restriction of the use of 
this technology to married couples is becoming less and less common.  The Uniform Parentage 
Act (UPA), as first promulgated in 1973, contained a section addressing the use of artificial 
insemination by married couples.5  The Act provided that if, under the supervision of a 
physician, a wife were artificially inseminated with a donor’s semen and with the consent of her 
husband, the husband would be the father of the resulting child.6  The UPA further provided that 
a donor of semen to a licensed physician was not the father of a resulting child unless the woman 
artificially inseminated was his wife.7  These provisions did not prohibit single women from 
being artificially inseminated; they merely prevented single women from becoming the sole 
parents of their children through artificial insemination.  The language referring to married 
couples and licensed physicians was eliminated in 2000 in order to “provide[ ] certainty of 
4 See Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
5 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001).
6 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001).
7 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 408 (2001).
5nonparentage for prospective donors.”8  The new provisions permit single women to become the 
sole parents of the children born to them via artificial insemination.9  Notably, the language of 
the new UPA, unlike that of the former UPA, is inclusive not only of unmarried women,10 but 
also of unmarried opposite-sex couples, whether or not those couples are intimately involved 
with each other.11  The provision is said to “reflect[] concern for the best interests of nonmarital 
as well as marital children of assisted reproduction . . . .”12
Most states regulate access to and the ramifications of artificial insemination in one way 
or another.  Some states specifically ban the use of artificial insemination by any but married 
couples,13 a more restrictive position than even that taken by the 1973 UPA.  Some states 
adopted the language of the 1973 UPA without revision14 or otherwise employed language that 
referred only to married couples.15  Other states altered the UPA’s provisions slightly so as not to 
8 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
9 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) (“The donor can neither sue to 
establish parental rights, nor be sued and required to support the resulting child. In sum, donors 
are eliminated from the parental equation.”).
10 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) (“UPA (2000) further opts not 
to limit nonparenthood of a donor to situations in which the donor provides sperm for assisted 
reproduction by a married woman.”).
11 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703, 9B U.L.A. __ (Supp. 2003); cf. Angela Mae Kupenda, Two 
Parents Are Better Than None: Whether Two Single, African-American Adults Who Are Not in a 
Traditional Marriage or a Romantic or Sexual Relationship with Each Other Should Be Allowed 
to Jointly Adopt and Co-parent African American Children, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 703 
(1997).
12 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 cmt., 9B U.L.A. __ (Supp. 2003). 
13 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 553 (1998).
14 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 
210.824 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(2) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 126.061(2) 
(1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(3) (Michie 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-257(D) (Michie 
2000).  A married woman is, of course, not required to obtain the consent of her husband to be 
artificially inseminated.  See Shin v. Kong, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304, 310 (Ct. App. 2000).
15 ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Michie 2000); FLA. STAT. ch. 
742.11(1) (Harrison 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1999); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS
§ 1-206 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46 § 4B; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824(6) (West 
6sever the paternity of the donor where the recipient’s husband did not consent to the 
insemination.16  Such provisions do not explicitly disallow single women from employing 
artificial insemination, but courts construing them have found no protection for single women 
who want to use these provisions to combat assertions of paternity by sperm donors.17  Another 
group of states addressed this problem by severing the paternity of the donor in all cases where 
the recipient was not the donor’s wife.18  In this respect, these statutes mirror the language of the 
new UPA, which provides likewise.19  None of this is to suggest, however, that single women do 
not nonetheless experience discrimination based on marital status in the provision of artificial 
insemination by private clinics.20  When they do and elect to self-inseminate with the sperm of a 
1997); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
40-6-106 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1989); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW  § 73 (McKinney 
1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-03 (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
10, § 551-53 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1996).  But see In re Michael, 636 N.Y.S.2d 
608, 609 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1996) (statute applied to woman unmarried at time of birth who later 
married).
16 See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Michie 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998); 
FLA. STAT. ch. 742.11 (1) (Harrison 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1999); 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 40/2 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., EST. &  TRUSTS § 1-206 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, 
§ 4B (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824(6) (West 1997); N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 
168-B:3(II) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN § 40-11-6(A) (Michie 2001); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW  § 
73(1) (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-03 (1997); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1996).
17 See R. Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three—or Four, or Five, or Six:  Redefining the Family 
after the Reprotech Revolution, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 231, 240 (2000).  
18 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(2) (West 
1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-775 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 39-5405(1) (Michie 1998); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 1993); OHIO REV. CODE. 
ANN. § 3111.95(B) (Anderson 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239(1) (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.26.050(2) (2001); WIS. STAT. § 891.40(2) (2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-103(b) (Michie 
2001).  But see Shin, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310 (concluding statute does not apply where husband’s 
consent not obtained) (citing Jhordan C. v. Mark K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537-38 (Ct. App. 1986).
19 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702, 703, 9B U.L.A. 355, 356 (2001).
20 See Charo, supra note 17, at 241; Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal 
Barriers to Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 150-51 (2000); Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism Without 
7known donor,21 they run the risk that courts will apply the distinction between known and 
unknown sperm donors that has been so prominent in the case law,22 despite statutory plain 
language,23 and recognize the paternity of the donor.24  The distinction, curiously, is nowhere 
acknowledged in the new UPA.25
Paternity:  Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 173, 175 (1996); Audra Elizabeth Laabs, Lesbian ART, 19 LAW 
& INEQ. 65, 82 (2001); see also Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist Social 
Justice Approach to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies:  A Case Study on the Limits of 
Liberal Theory, 84 KY. L.J. 1197, 1217 (1995-96) (noting disparities based on race in the 
provision of fertility services); Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 935, 940-42 (1996) (suggesting underlying causes of racial disparity in fertility 
treatment).
21 See DeLair, supra note 20, at 163.
22 See Charo, supra note 17, at 241-42, 247.  See, e.g., Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 
356, 357, 362 (App. Div. 1994); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (statutory protection of 
recipient does not apply where parties had an agreement that donor’s parental rights would be 
preserved); C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9,11 (1994) (same); In Circuit Court, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., Aug. 5, 1997, at 3 (reporting ruling that “the act does not intend to bar a known donor 
from trying to assert his parental rights”).  But see McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 243 (Or. 
1989) (holding statute applies even where physician does not perform insemination, donor is not 
anonymous, and recipient is unmarried); Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 522 (Or. Ct. App. 
1994) (known donor not entitled to legal recognition of paternity because he agreed not to assert 
paternity); In re Matthew B, 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (surrogate stipulated to 
the paternity of the intending father).
23 See, e.g., In Circuit Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 5, 1997, at 3 (reporting ruling that act 
barring paternity claim by donor who is not the wife of the recipient did not apply to bar a known 
donor from trying to assert his parental rights); see Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby 
Making:  An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 
835, 904 (2000) (“[A]lthough facially neutral, the law discriminates in practice between sperm 
donors who give directly to users and those who give to sperm banks.”).
24 See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (Ct. App. 1986).  Similarly, whereas a 
sperm donor’s agreement not to assert paternity may be enforceable, see Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 
P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994), an agreement releasing a sperm donor from any obligation for 
child support in exchange for his sperm is not, see Ferguson v. McKiernan, No. J. A15043-04 
(Pa. Sup. Ct. Jul. 22, 2004).  
25
 Indeed, some language appears to invite courts to continue drawing the distinction.  Professor 
John Sampson, who served as the reporter for the new UPA, has commented that a donor who 
intends to be a father “can be found not to be a ‘donor’ [, since] if the understanding between 
him and the mother was that they intended him to have parental rights, . . . “ he would resemble a 
husband who contributes his own sperm to be used by his wife for assisted reproduction.  See
8Institutions and commentators have assumed various positions on restricting artificial 
insemination in some way relating to marriage.  On one extreme is the Catholic Church, which 
simply disapproves of assisted reproduction in any form.  Others believe regulations limiting 
artificial insemination to married couples violates the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection.26  As a policy matter, many disapprove of single parenthood and revile the growing 
single-motherhood-by- choice movement made possible by the lowering of discriminatory 
barriers to artificial insemination.27  Others more specifically disapprove of “special” rules for 
artificial insemination that allow single women to become sole parents but withhold the same 
option from single women who have children via coitus.28  At least some of this concern about 
single motherhood appears related to concerns about legitimacy and support for children.29
Although the debate over sole legal parenthood for single women who employ artificial 
insemination continues, and although single women will continue to face private discrimination 
Uniform Parentage Act (2000) (with Unofficial Annotations by John J. Sampson, Reporter), 35 
FAM. L. Q. 83, 162 n.73 (2001).  The inclusion of unmarried opposite-sex couples in the 2002 
revisions of the UPA may be an attempt to address the status of known donors.   
26 See In re Michael, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 609 (“[T]he court [is unaware] of any distinction, based 
upon marital status, being mandated by law with regard to a woman’s right to be artificially 
inseminated.  It might very well be unconstitutional for the law to try to make such a 
distinction.”) (citing Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995)); Note, Reproductive 
Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 682, 683-84 
(1985); Garrison, supra note 24, at 911 n.341 (reasoning from right-of-privacy jurisprudence that 
“the state cannot deny access to a means of achieving pregnancy based on marital status.”).
27 See, e.g., Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Decline of Marriage as the Social Basis of 
Childrearing, in PROMISES TO KEEP:  DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 3, 5 
(David Popenoe, Jean Bethke Elshtain, et al., eds. 1996) (in a chapter on how it is best for 
children to be raised by their married parents, describing “single mothers by choice” as women 
who are committed more to expressing their individuality than to the welfare of their children)
[hereinafter PROMISES]. 
28 See Garrison, supra note 24, at 843, 873, 879, 882.   
29 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 357 (2001).  If the husband and wife have 
not lived together since her insemination, and if the husband never held the child out as his own, 
9from fertility clinics, at the level of law policy marriage has by and large lost its force as a 
regulatory barrier to artificial insemination.   
his lawsuit may be brought at any time.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705(b), 9B U.L.A. 357 
(2001)
10
B.  Marriage and Surrogacy
Although most statutes governing surrogacy simply outlaw the practice,30 a few states 
have enacted provisions that permit certain individuals to become parents via surrogacy.31  Most 
of these statutory schemes permit only married couples to commission surrogates for this 
purpose.32  Thus, unlike in the context of assisted reproduction, marriage remains a controlling 
influence on the law and policy governing surrogacy.  
Most of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law’s (NCCUSL) 
enactments on surrogacy have restricted the use of surrogacy to married couples.  The 1973 
version of the UPA did not address surrogacy, but in the 1980's, the Commission promulgated a 
uniform act known as the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (USCACA).  
The USCACA embodied two options relating to surrogacy, one, Option A, permitting it but 
closely regulating it, the other, Option B, outlawing surrogacy.  The act was largely unsuccessful 
and was repealed by the 2000 overhaul of the UPA.  As a part of this overhaul, NCCUSL 
promulgated a comprehensive set of provisions which governed the ability of married couples to 
commission surrogates, which incorporated the USCACA with little change but the elimination 
of Option B.  
In 2002, NCCUSL again revamped the UPA’s Article 8 to eliminate the restriction on the 
use of surrogacy to married couples.  The change permits married or unmarried heterosexual 
30 See Garrison, supra note 24, at 851.
31 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 742.13(2) (Harrison 2001); 
NEV. REV. STAT. 126.045(4)(a) (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1(XII), 168-B:17(III) 
(1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(9) (Michie 2000).
32
 Statutes in Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, Virginia all contain provisions requiring at least 
one of the intending parents to be a genetic parent of the child. See FLA. STAT. ch. 742.13(2) 
(Harrison 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 126.045(4)(a) (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-
B:1(XII), 168-B:17(III)(1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(9) (Michie 2000).
11
couples to engage a surrogate.  Whether this change of position was due to the tepid response of 
legislatures or the vociferous opposition by the American Bar Association (ABA) to the UPA has 
not been made public.  What is known is that family-law expert Professor Joan Heifetz Hollinger 
served as a liaison between NCCUSL and the ABA in a vigorous and sustained effort “to ensure 
that the principle of equal treatment of all children without regard to the marital status of their 
parents [was] followed throughout the new UPA.”33  Hollinger argued that a child born to an 
unmarried man and woman, including children born through assisted reproduction or in the 
context of a gestational agreement, should have the same rights and relationship with his or her 
parents or intended parents as a child born to a married couple.  Her successful effort seems to 
have been motivated less by purely constitutional concerns as by the need to align the legal 
treatment of marital and nonmarital children, the hallmark of the UPA since its original 
promulgation in 1973.34
Like the USCACA, the UPA’s Article 8 in either its former or new-and-improved form 
has been of little interest to legislative bodies.  Only two states, Virginia and North Dakota, made 
use of the USCACA, and only Texas, the home state of the reporter of new UPA, enacted the 
2000 form of Article 8, albeit with some revisions.  Utah, the home state of another reporter, 
considered enacting Article 8 in its 2000 form, but that initiative was defeated in the 2004 
legislative session.35  As for the 2002 form of Article 8, a bill in substantially that form was 
introduced in Illinois but was left pending in committee at the end of the 2004 legislative 
33 Newsletter, Family and Juvenile Law Section, Association of American Law Schools, May 
2003.
34 See In re Raphael P., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Johnson v. 
Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 497 (1993)).
35
 SB 45; http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2004/htmdoc/sbillhtm/sb0045s02.htm.
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session.36  A bill brought in Maine expanded the scope of Article 8 to permit an individual as 
well as couples to engage a surrogate, but the bill also died in committee at the end of the 
session.37  No legislature is currently considering the enactment of any form of Article 8. 
C.  Interpreting Marriage-based Restrictions on Assisted Reproduction
In 2002, I argued that functional theories of parenthood–not marriage–are what support 
intentional parentage in the context of assisted reproduction.38 In the course of my analysis, I 
took issue with Professor Marsha Garrison’s argument that no good policy justifies different 
parentage rules for assisted reproduction cases than apply to children born of coitus.39 Although 
I disagree with Garrison’s articulation of traditional parentage principles and her views on 
parentage-determination policy in assisted-reproduction cases, I did state then and continue to 
believe that her “interpretive approach” has much to offer policymakers.  The approach, for 
example, helps demonstrate that marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy conflict with sound 
social policy. 
1.  The “Interpretive Approach”
Garrison’s interpretive approach is borrowed from the work of tax scholar Professor 
Edward McCaffery40 and is called “interpretivism” by McCaffery and constitutional law 
36
 HB 4742; 
http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=4742&GAID=3&DocTypeID=H
B&LegID=9341&SessionID=3
37
 LD 1851; http://janus.state.me.us/legis/LawMakerWeb/summary.asp?ID=280012496.
38
 Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional 
Approach to Parentage, 53 HAST. L.J. 597 (2002).
39 See id. at 632-39.
40 See Marsha Garrison, An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV.
41, 46 n.30 (1998) [hereinafter Garrison, Evaluation].  In his article, The Uneasy Case for 
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scholars.41 Interpretivism is an interpretive approach supportive of the living Constitution and 
other doctrines that grew out of the critical legal studies and process theory movements and that
undergirds American liberalism.42
Garrison invokes McCaffery’s approach to policy formulation by asking family
policymakers to engage in a multi-principle dialectic consisting of constitutional requirements, 
contemporary laws, and legislative trends.43 Doing so affords policymakers awareness of 
society’s actual practices and beliefs44 and thereby to leaven their rulemaking with consistency45
and neutrality,46 avoiding the myopia of “top-down” argumentation, mere intuition, or 
sloganeering.  The result is family policy of integrity,47 respectful of family law’s expressive 
function,48 and commanding broad public support.49  Applied in any legal context, interpretivism 
Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 286- 87 (1994), McCaffery describes his preferred 
method of policy formulation: “The political freedom to seek new answers makes more 
important the grounding of [policy] on the at least implicit ideas and conceptions of a modern 
democratic society, and calls for a more careful and sensitive reading of our actual practices. 
Careful and sensitive interpretation, in turn, helps to lead politics to reasonable answers.”  Id. at 
287.
41 Id. at 287.  See, e.g., Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 703 (1975); Thomas Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:  Fundamental Law in 
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).  Mark Tushnet criticizes the 
interpretive and neutral-principles approaches to constitutional interpretation in Mark V. 
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983), finding these approaches internally incoherent.
42 See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996).
43 See Garrison, supra note 24, at 844, 845, 878, 901.
44 See id. at 842.  “A core tenet of interpretivism is that meaningful actions and beliefs 
substantially constitute social life.”  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY:  
PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF THE LAW 247 (1997).
45 See id. at 842, 878, 911.
46 See id. at 897 (“gender neutrality may be constitutionally required”); 920.
47 See id. at 879.
48
 The expressive function of the law refers to how it signals “the underlying attitudes of a 
community or society.”  Richard McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. 
REV. 339, 340 (2000).  On the expressive function of family law, see Carol Weisbrod, On the 
Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991 (1989).
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resembles the analogical reasoning that characterizes the traditional process of judicial 
decisionmaking.50  At the same time, given its emphasis on consistency and neutrality in the law, 
interpretivism appears to set the standard for legislation on a higher than merely rational basis, 
somewhere in the broadly undefined realm of heightened scrutiny.  In other words, an 
“uncommonly silly law” that would survive rational basis scrutiny, then, might well fail to meet 
the demands of interpretivism. Rational basis with bite (see Kramer U. of Ill. Article).
2.  Interpretivism and Marriage-Based Restrictions on Surrogacy
Marriage has been an important part of social systems worldwide for millennia.  Its value 
to contemporary American society is primarily as a socially sanctioned locus for sexual activity, 
procreation, and support for children.  Despite the importance of marriage to society generally, 
an interpretivist stance with regard to marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy demonstrates that 
such restrictions run counter to sound social policy.  First, surrogacy legislation has nothing to do 
with the primary purposes of marriage–the legitimation of sexual activity and the legitimation of 
children.  Second, the marital relationship of the intending parents is insufficient to guarantee 
two-parent support for the children born of surrogacy.  Third, marriage-based restrictions on 
surrogacy do not encourage marriage.  Finally and perhaps most important, marriage-based 
49 See Garrison, supra note 24, at 841, 847.
50 See id. at 843 (“The common law method employed by Anglo-American courts for 
generations is, of course, another application of the interpretive perspective.” ); 873 (“The 
methodology could perhaps be described as a form of legal casuistry.  Certainly it bears a strong 
resemblance to the traditional process of analogical reasoning utilized by judges.”); 873 (“The 
example of judicial decisionmaking helps to differentiate the interpretive approach from both the 
top-down methodology and the intuitive approaches . . . .”); 875 (“Process engaged in by judges 
offers an excellent model for a lawmaking heuristic . . . .”); 876  (stating that a national 
commission’s approach “strongly resembled the traditional process of judicial decisionmaking”); 
Garrison, Evaluation, supra note 40, at 47 n.32 (“The interpretive approach is consistent with the 
ideal of public reason as the means by which a society makes decisions.”).
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restrictions on surrogacy conflict with interpretivism’s commitment to consistency and neutrality 
in the law.  For all of these reasons, marital-status exclusions in the law of surrogacy lack the 
legal integrity that is interpretivism’s overriding objective.  
a.  Sexual Intercourse
Marriage apologists tend to extol marriage with great generality.  It has been lauded as 
the foundation of the family, as essential to the advancement of civilization, as essential to the 
propagation of humanity, and even as critical to economic prosperity.  While it is tempting to 
agree with such globalizing statements, the purpose of marriage, according to a meticulously 
documented article by Professor Sally Goldfarb, is heterosexual intercourse.51  Goldfarb’s
assiduous research into this question is further bolstered by its consistency with the longstanding 
belief that sexual activity outside of marriage is corrosive of the social fabric.  Marriage has 
always been thought an effective repository for sexual energies that if left unregulated would 
wreak havoc on the integrity of society.52 As a theoretical and practical matter, marriage makes 
sex legitimate for and readily available to the marital couple, effectively diminishing their need 
to expend energy and resources pursuing sexual partners.  
It goes without saying that these beliefs about the proper place for sex have nothing to do 
with assisted reproduction.  Indeed, sexual intercourse has explicitly been defined as lying 
51 See Sally Goldfarb, Family Law, Marriage, and Heterosexuality:  Questioning the 
Assumptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 285, 287, 288, 293, 295, 296, 301 (1998).
52
 This notion has resonance in religious writings explaining how “[m]arriage takes the demon 
out of sexual intercourse.” JAMES H. OLTHUIS, I PLEDGE YOU MY TROTH 33 (1975).  It is also 
consistent with the notion that marriage is not simply for procreation, but is “first of all for the 
partners . . . .”  Id. at 45.  The Catholic Church’s Canon 1055 contains a similar idea: Marriage is 
“ordered toward the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of children . . . .”  
MICHAEL SMITH FOSTER, ANNULMENT: THE WEDDING THAT WASN’T 12 (1999).  Indeed, an 
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beyond the scope of assisted reproduction.  It would defy logic, then, to argue that marriage-
based restrictions on assisted reproduction have the effect of extolling the value of marriage as a 
repository for heterosexual intercourse.  Limiting forms of assisted reproduction to married 
couples, then, cannot be justified as advancing marriage’s role in the regulation of human sexual 
relations.  
b.  Legitimation of Children
Marriage’s value to society has been said to lie in part in its power to legitimate 
offspring.  Marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy, then, might be understood as a way of 
channeling legitimacy of birth.  But legitimacy of birth is not achieved by restricting surrogacy to 
married couples.  In fact, were legitimacy of birth any longer of importance in the regulation of 
family relationships, inheritance and other matters, it would be necessary to acknowledge that no 
child born of a gestational agreement is legitimate.  This is because the law has never recognized 
legitimation based on the fact of marriage alone.  Legitimation by marital presumption has 
always depended upon a child’s being “born to” a marriage, and this, in turn, has required that 
the wife perform at least the gestational function of reproduction.  Moreover, the marital 
presumption of legitimacy is a presumption of paternity, not of maternity.  This is not to suggest 
that presumptions of paternity do not apply to the establishment of maternity53 but simply that 
marriage does nothing to alter the presumption that the woman who gestates a child is the child’s 
mother.  By way of illustration, if a single woman gives birth to a child by a married man, the 
ecclesiastical annulment on the basis of impotence is not available for sterility but simply for an 
inability to perform sexual intercourse.  See id. at 17.
53
 Although rare, cases where a presumption of maternity is raised in favor of a woman with no 
biological link to the child do exist.  See, e.g., In re Karen C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct. App. 
2002).  The presumption was in no way related, however, to the woman’s marital status.
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man’s wife is not presumed to be the child’s mother, even if the man’s wife contributed her egg 
to the arrangement.54
Not only do marital restrictions on surrogacy not promote legitimacy of birth; the very 
argument that they are intended to strains credulity.  NCCUSL itself originally promulgated the 
UPA to end discrimination against nonmarital children, and this laudable objective has been 
carried forward in the UPA’s new formulation.55  It would be contradictory to issue a 
pronouncement of the inherent dignity of all children regardless of their birth status and 
simultaneously to express concern about the legitimacy of children born of surrogacy.  Such a 
stance would moreover render the UPA internally inconsistent:  Article 6 of the UPA permits 
alleged fathers to rebut the marital presumption of legitimacy, and Article 7 promotes single 
motherhood by denying the paternity of sperm donors.  Thus, marriage-based restrictions on 
surrogacy are not intended to and moreover could not ensure legitimacy of birth.  
c.  Two-Parent Support
Perhaps the most instantly appealing justification for marriage-based restrictions on 
surrogacy is the strong societal policy which favors charging at least two persons with support 
obligations for each child and identifying them at the earliest possible point in time, thus making
it as unlikely as possible that the child will at any time become a public charge.56  Marriage is 
without doubt a particularly efficient tool by which to ground two-parent support.  When a child 
54 See, e.g., Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Doe v. Doe, 710 
A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998).
55 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 2, 9B U.L.A. __ (2001) (“[C]hildren born to parents who are 
not married to each other have the same rights . . . as children born to parents who are married to 
each other.”).    
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is born to a married couple, gestational and marital-presumption parentage are called into play, 
and the law requires the couple to support the child.  Under this rubric, which applies based on 
easily obtainable public facts, there is no point in time when the identity of those responsible for 
the support of the child is in doubt.57  Although it does not necessarily follow, this assumption 
about marriage brings along with it the view that unmarried couples, by contrast, will be less 
likely to provide children with two-parent support.  This view applies in particular to unwed 
fathers, whose paternity is not always established as a legal matter.  
As we have already seen in Part II.C.2.b, supra, marital-presumption parentage applies in 
surrogacy cases in ways the parties to gestational agreements wish to circumvent.  When a child 
is born to a surrogate, the marital presumption points to the surrogate mother and her husband or
the surrogate and the genetic father as the responsible parties.  Two-parent support for children 
born of surrogacy, then, is not dependent upon restricting surrogacy to married couples.  The aim 
of surrogacy legislation is not to identify the parties responsible for a child in the first instance 
but simply to shift responsibility for the child to other parties by overcoming the traditional 
presumptions and decreeing a different set of obligations.  It can do so in at least three different 
ways: (1) requiring that the intended parents adopt the child after the child’s birth,58 (2) 
mandating state approval of surrogacy agreements at the time of their creation and decreeing 
their ramifications,59 or (3) issuing pre-birth declarations of parentage.60 Under all three 
approaches, two-parent support is achieved through provisions that have nothing to do with 
56
 Aside from the interest in child support, the two-parent model seems driven by the idea that 
each child should have one mother and one father, no more and no less.  This basis for justifying 
marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy is discussed in Part II.C.2.e infra.
57 See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002).
58 See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
59 See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8, 9B U.L.A. __ (2001).
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marriage and involve judicial intervention not required when a married couple has a child via 
traditional means.  Under the Uniform Parentage Act’s Article 8 and similar statutory schemes, 
for example, the intending parents, whether married or not, must embody their intentions in a 
written document and must submit this document to the court for judicial pre-approval.61  If they 
fail to do so, they are not relieved of an obligation to support the child.  The document is simply 
given no effect and traditional parentage rules apply.62  Even if they are not recognized as the 
child’s legal parents at its birth, though, the intending parents are still liable for support under the 
specific terms of Article 8 if they refuse to adopt the child.63  Also, if the intending parents 
decide not to comply with the terms of the agreement at any time that it remains executory after 
impregnation of the surrogate, their obligation to support the child is unaffected. 64  In 
consequence, even if the intending couple’s intentions toward the child changed, they would not 
be relieved of their support obligation.  Similar obligation attaches if the marriage of the 
60 See, e.g., Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 433 (Mass. 2001).
61 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(a), 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001) (providing that agreement must be 
in writing); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803, 9B U.L.A. 364 (2001) (explaining requirements for 
judicial pre-approval of gestational agreement); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 63.212(1)(i) (West Supp. 
2001) (providing for review by the court of pre-planned adoption arrangements and requiring 
filing of petition in connection with pre-planned adoption agreement); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 
63.212(1)(i)(2) (West Supp. 2001) (outlining required terms of pre-planned adoption agreement); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:21, § 168-B:25 (1994) (laying out judicial preauthorization 
provisions and mandatory signed surrogacy contract terms); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159 (Michie 
2000) (providing for validity of written surrogacy contracts); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (Michie 
2000) (judicial preauthorization provision).
62 See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(E), § 20-162 (Michie 2000); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809(a), 
9B U.L.A. 369 (2001).
63 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 361 (2001) (“[I]ndividuals who enter into 
nonvalidated gestational agreements and later refuse to adopt the resulting child may be liable for 
support of the child.”); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809(c), 9B U.L.A. 369 (2001).  
64 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:8(IV) (1994) (“A breach of a surrogacy contract by the 
intended parents shall not affect their support obligation.”).
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intending parents ends in separation or divorce.65 These provisions suggest that responsibility 
may have to be recognized completely apart from parentage, again underscoring the lack of any 
useful presumptions in these cases.  
This elaborate set of regulations demonstrates the lack of any role for marriage in either 
determining or solidifying support obligations for children born of surrogacy.  Instead, the rules 
of obligation in Article 8 are simply necessary substitutions for support obligations that would 
otherwise flow automatically from well established presumptions of parentage, including those 
grounded in marriage, that the parties to surrogacy agreements wish to avoid.  These rules mirror 
what Professor June Carbone has found to be a trend in other areas of family law.  Carbone notes 
that, more and more, “marital status has been supplanted by financial and emotional maturity as 
the indicia of responsible parenthood.”66  Financial and emotional maturity are, of course, 
precisely what a court in validating a gestational agreement wants most to ascertain about the 
intending parents.  Evidence of marital status, though, is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
establishing these traits.  Since the support provisions of Article 8 and other similar regulations 
ensure two-parent support for any child born of a gestational agreement and do not look to 
marriage for any reason having to do with ensuring two-parent support, interpretivism supports 
the rejection of marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy.  
d.  Encouragement of Marriage
As a matter of public policy, we value marriage in part because we believe married 
couples will discharge a set of responsibilities toward each other and that their doing so will have 
many salutary effects on our society.  As a consequence, we bestow upon married couples 
65 See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(C) (Michie 2000).
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“numerous benefits . . . and protections,”67 with the intention of encouraging people to become 
and stay married.  The vast majority of these protections and benefits have been associated with 
marriage for a very long time and have become firmly established as indelible markers of 
marriage’s revered status.  Perhaps marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy are drawn with this 
policy in mind.  If so, these restrictions are in complete accord with established public policy.  
While it has been true that marriage has historically been endowed with numerous 
privileges and benefits, these benefits have remained relatively fixed through time.  It is rare 
occurrence that married couples are made the sole beneficiaries of newly created privileges.  
Instead, recent legislative initiatives to encourage or benefit marriage have taken one of three 
forms: (1) clarifying the definition of marriage at both the federal and the state levels; (2) 
lowering barriers to entry, and (3) lowering barriers to exit.  
Those advocating for clarification that marriage may only exist between two persons of
opposing genders seek not to benefit married couples alone but to reaffirm heterosexual marriage 
as the organizing principle essential to the integrity of society.68  Much of the language 
developed by this initiative describes the “natural” or “traditional” family as attainable only 
through the marriage of one man with one woman.69  At the same time, any elitist or 
exclusionary overtones that might emanate from such a conception of marriage are tempered by 
its easy availability.  The law demands less mental capacity to marry than is required either to 
make a basic will or enter into a simple contract, and even minors, with proper parental or court 
approval, are permitted to marry.  The court system has been cooperative in this project.  In his 
66 JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS (2000).
67 AN ACT RELATING TO CIVIL UNIONS (H. 847), LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS § 1(4) (Vt. 2000).
68 See discussion of the marriage movement, infra. 
69
 http://www.nyx.net/~jkalb/rants/family_congress.html
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research, Professor Milton Regan has discerned a judicial trend toward applying a more exacting 
level of scrutiny against state regulation of marriage than was true forty years ago.70  Barriers to 
exit have been dramatically dismantled by the widespread appearance of no-fault divorce 
provisions throughout the 1970s.  Although the impact of such provisions is the subject of 
intense debate,71 some expert commentators firmly believe that no-fault regimes encourage 
marriage if only because removing the coercive aspects of marriage helps make it more palatable 
to those who would otherwise be hesitant to give it a try.  Furthermore, no-fault divorce does not 
conflict with policy favoring remarriage.72  Statistics support at the very least the view that the 
effect of no-fault divorce provisions on the marriage rate is benign.  Despite the rise in the 
number of divorces that no-fault provisions has made possible in the last thirty years, there has 
been no corresponding plunge in the marriage rate.  Indeed, perhaps because of the existence of 
no-fault divorce, marriage is at present experiencing an increase in popularity.73
There is good reason to doubt that marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy encourage 
marriage.  NCCUSL initially included a marriage requirement in its uniform surrogacy 
70 See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Marriage at the Millennium, 33 FAM. L. Q. 647, 652, 655 (1999) 
(describing the present application of a more demanding level of scrutiny to state regulation of 
marriage than was applied forty years ago).  Professor Mary Ann Glendon attributes this more 
demanding level of scrutiny to the recognition of marriage as a “fundamental right” in Loving v. 
Virginia.  See Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State:  The Withering away of Marriage, 62 
VA. L. REV. 663, 668 (1976)
71 See F. Carolyn Graglia, A Non-Feminist=s Perspectives of Mothers and Homemakers under 
Chapter 2, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 995, 996, 1002 [hereinafter Graglia, Non-Feminist].  
72 See Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy:  Uncovering the Bias in Favor of 
Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 MO. L. REV. 527, 584 
n.415 (2001).
73
 Mireya Navarro, Spreading the Pope’s Message of Sexuality and a Willing Spirit, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 7, 2004, at B1; Barbara Dafoe Whitehead & David Popenoe, For Richer and for Poorer, 
Marriage Makes a Comeback, BOSTON GLOBE, May 12, 2002, at E8.  But see David 
Blankenhorn, The Marriage Problem, AMERICAN EXPERIMENT QUARTERLY, Spring 2003, at 61, 
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provisions not to encourage marriage but because it had the utmost sympathy for married couples 
who, after struggling for years to procreate only to discover they have waited too long to adopt, 
turn to surrogacy as a last act of desperation.  From this perspective, gestational surrogacy 
actually appears to be something that most couples would not want from marriage.  Restricting 
gestational surrogacy to married couples, then, would have little impact on a couple’s decision to 
marry.  Although marriage-based surrogacy restrictions provide little encouragement to marry in 
the first instance, they perhaps provide an incentive for couples near the end of a long and 
painful journey of infertility to stay married so that they may pursue surrogacy.  That aim would 
certainly comport with the public policy favoring fostering the longevity of intact marriages.  
The aim could just as effectively be accomplished, though, in the absence of marriage-based 
restrictions on surrogacy.  It is quite hard to see, in other words, how the inclusion of unmarried 
couples in surrogacy legislation would inspire couples who are already married to divorce before 
entering into a surrogacy agreement.  As a final possibility, then, marriage- based restrictions 
might actually force unmarried couples who have not been able to procreate and now want to 
enter a gestational agreement to get married at last.  Such a scenario is not impossible to 
envision, though it would no doubt arise very seldom.  In any event, a marriage entered into for 
the sole purpose of executing a gestational agreement is probably not at all what the policy of 
encouraging marriage is meant to accomplish.  At the very least, such a marriage is not the 
“deserving” one NCCUSL was referring to when it initially included marriage-based restrictions 
in the 2000 UPA.  In the final analysis, then, marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy appear to 
have very little or nothing to do with encouraging marriage.   
66 (explaining that the belief in a “marriage turnaround” is based on weak and inconclusive 
demographic evidence) [hereinafter Blankenhorn, Marriage Problem]. 
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e.  Concerns about Consistency and Neutrality
Interpretivism requires social policy to exhibit consistency and neutrality if it is to 
command broad public support.  In the context of surrogacy, interpretivism calls marriage-based 
restrictions into question both on the basis of their inconsistency with well settled constitutional 
principles related to procreative liberty and to the differential treatment of marital and non-
marital children.  
i.  Restrictions on Access to Reproductive Options
Although it is permissible to limit the procreative freedom of prisoners and 
probationers,74 it is simply not consistent with the American constitutional tradition to condition 
the procreative rights of others upon their marital status.  Even if one could argue that a case like 
Skinner v. Oklahoma expresses an essential linkage between marriage and procreative liberty,75
such a reading ultimately falters under the weight of more recent Supreme Court 
pronouncements guaranteeing procreative liberty to the married and the unmarried alike.  The 
marriage-procreation link is also absent from parental-autonomy jurisprudence.  Parham v. J.R., 
for example, nowhere suggests a relationship between marriage and the presumption that parents 
act in the best interests of their children.76  If the presumption were dependent upon a marital 
relationship, Parham would have asserted as much, since the Supreme Court had recognized the 
procreative rights of unmarried persons nearly a decade before it decided that case.  Unmarried 
parents benefit as fully from the presumption as do their married counterparts.  
74
 Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1039 
(2002); State v. Oakley, 635 N.W.2d 760 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002).
75 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage and procreation are 
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”).
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Without a link between marriage and procreative liberty, what the issue becomes for 
surrogacy is whether it falls within the ambit of procreative freedom and thus outside of the 
realm of behavior it is permissible to restrict on the basis of marital status.  Some courts and 
commentators believe that assisted reproduction, including surrogacy, is constitutionally 
protected procreation.  Perhaps the best known commentator on the constitutional dimensions of 
assisted reproduction, Professor John Robertson, has concluded that “collaborative reproduction 
[including surrogacy] is an important part of procreative liberty.”77  Some courts hold similar 
views on assisted reproduction, at least in part.  The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, 
has stated that artificial insemination is a constitutionally protected procreative interest.  Some 
federal courts agree, and at least one has deemed engaging a gestational surrogate an act of 
procreative liberty.78  Insofar as equal protection is concerned, a New York court (in In re 
Michael) has stated in dicta that it might be a violation of equal protection for a statute to allow 
76 See J.R. v. Parham, 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
77 See also Garrison, supra note 24, at  856.
78
 Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (embryo transfer); Cameron v. 
Board of Education, 795 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (artificial insemination).  In J.R. v. 
Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002), the plaintiffs argued that Utah’s statutorily 
mandated determination of parentage in surrogacy cases violated their constitutional right to 
procreative liberty.  The court saw the issue less as one whether surrogacy was a constitutional 
right (the statute did not outlaw surrogacy per se, and the court admitted the U.S. Supreme Court 
had made no pronouncement on the matter, see 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1275) but whether the statute 
unduly restricted their parental rights by forcing genetic parents to adopt their own children.  See 
261 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.  Lifchez and Cameron suggest procreative liberty encompasses 
surrogacy, since in those cases third parties collaborated in the reproductive process.  It may be, 
though, that J.R. means the protection extends to intending parents who contribute their gametes 
to the reproductive process.  This would mean that gestational surrogacy is protected but that 
traditional surrogacy is not. CONUNDRUMS WITH PENUMBRAS: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
ENCOMPASSES NON-GAMETE PROVIDERS WHO CREATE PREEMBRYOS WITH THE 
INTENT TO BECOME PARENTS, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 625, 651 (2003) 
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only married women the right to employ assisted reproduction,79 and NCCUSL has described 
one of the aims of its newly revamped Uniform Parentage Act as the “constitutional protection[] 
of the procreative rights of unmarried . . . women.”80  Older cases and commentary sometimes 
take a different view, suggesting that surrogacy is a far cry from procreative freedom and is, 
moreover, unethical.  Legislation outlawing surrogacy sends the strong message that it is in 
conflict with important social policies and deeply held values.    
These various viewpoints on the procreative character of surrogacy at best leave 
unresolved the issue of whether surrogacy is included in our understanding of constitutionally 
protected procreative activities.  They also indicate that surrogacy as a method of having children 
is not widely embraced.  Given that most jurisdictions have no legislation on surrogacy, and of 
the ones that do, most simply outlaw the practice, we realize that our society is at the very least 
undecided whether surrogacy is acceptable.  If interpretivism were merely concerned with the 
scope of constitutionally protected procreative activity and contemporary views on surrogacy, it 
would not be offended by outlawing surrogacy altogether or limiting it to married couples.  As a 
matter of our contemporary values, then, an outright rejection of gestational agreements would 
not offend the interpretive approach.  
Furthermore, even where surrogacy is condoned, it may be that marriage-based 
restrictions–although they do nothing to encourage marriage–are a way of expressing profound 
respect for marriage.  This sentiment was precisely what drove the inclusion of a marriage-based 
restriction on surrogacy in the 2000 version of the UPA.  Indeed, the Conference’s express 
79 See, e.g., In re Michael, 636 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (Surr. Ct. 1996) (“Nor is the court aware of 
any distinction, based upon marital status, being mandated by law with regard to a woman's right 
to be artificially inseminated. It might very well be unconstitutional for the law to try to make 
such a distinction.”).
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position in support of the restriction was that married couples entering gestational agreements are 
“the most deserving class of persons that would participate in these agreements.”81  Moreover, 
legislative initiatives aimed at creating special rights for married couples, albeit rare, are hardly 
unknown.  The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, in spite of its stated policy that 
workplace leave should be available in ways that support family integrity, contains a narrow 
definition of “immediate family member” that excludes unmarried couples from the ambit of its 
protections.  Married couples received a sweeping exemption from taxation in 1981 when 
Congress supplemented our unified transfer tax system with the unlimited marital deduction.  
Even President Bush’s “healthy marriage initiative” could be construed as a measure enshrining 
“special rights” for married couples only.82 When Vermont passed its civil union legislation in 
2000, it cataloged around thirty ways in which marriage was accorded special status under 
Vermont law.83  Marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy may simply be another way our 
society elects to express that marriage is valuable, significant, and revered.  
As explained above, however, interpretivism is not concerned merely with one set of 
contemporary values or constitutional guarantees.  Other values, constitutional guarantees and 
consistency in the law are equally important.  Equal protection, for example, could be raised as a 
barrier to permitting only married couples to participate in gestational agreements.84  Even if 
surrogacy itself is not widely embraced, equality of treatment certainly is and is arguably 
embodied in the general trend, described by Professor Mary Ann Glendon almost thirty years 
80 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
81 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8, 9B U.L.A. __ (2001) (emphasis supplied).
82 See Marriage Proposal, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 17, 2004, at A10.
83 See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1204.
84 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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ago, that “legal distinctions between the married and the unmarried . . . are being erased.”85
Finally, consistency in the law appears undermined by treating non-sexual forms of reproduction 
differently from sexual forms of reproduction.86
The force of these observations is that it is not essential to determine whether surrogacy 
is a fundamental right or to worry that surrogacy is not a widely embraced method of 
reproduction in order to establish that where a state chooses to endorse surrogacy, it must do so 
in a way that does not exclude unmarried couples.  This conclusion is not changed by the fact 
that our legal system condones discrimination on the basis of marital status unless that 
discrimination lacks a rational basis.  For social policy to achieve the broad social acceptance 
that is the aim of interpretivism, it must aim to satisfy a higher standard than mere rational basis.  
In other words, whereas “an uncommonly silly law” might have a rational basis to shield it 
against constitutional attack, such a law would not survive under interpretivism’s more exacting 
microscope.  Even if discrimination on the basis of marital status is certain to survive rational 
basis scrutiny in many contexts, society’s commitment to equal treatment and interpretivism’s 
commitment to consistency in the law would successfully call into question the integrity of such 
an exclusion in the context of surrogacy regulation.
ii.  Equal Treatment of Non-Marital Children
A final problem with marriage-based restrictions on surrogacy is their inconsistency with 
interpretivism’s commitment to neutrality.  As explained above, these restrictions are neither 
intended to have nor do they have the effect of promoting legitimacy of birth.  Neither do they 
play a role in securing child welfare.  To the extent that these restrictions nonetheless serve a 
85
 Glendon, supra note 70, at 665.
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significant expressive function in creating the illusion of legitimacy of birth, they nonetheless run 
afoul of what are now firmly established constitutional and social commitments to equal 
treatment.  In brief, we agree that the law should be neutral toward a class of persons that is 
blameless in incurring unfavorable treatment.  To regulate surrogacy so as to permit only the 
birth of children who appear to be legitimate undermines neutrality by perpetuating the very  
legitimacy/illegitimacy distinction that has been fully discredited at the highest level of our 
judiciary.87  Not only would such regulation be inimical to equal treatment but it would also be 
an improper use of the law to give public effect to private biases.88  Thus, any purpose of using a 
marriage requirement to promote legitimacy of children is out of step with constitutional 
principles and contemporary views of children’s rights.  It moreover is not in keeping with the 
need for neutrality in the formulation of sound social policy.  
Exclusion of unmarried couples from entering into surrogacy agreements is unjustified 
when examined through the lens of interpretivism.  The exclusion does not encourage marriage 
or promote the purposes of marriage.  Instead, it appears to conflict with important constitutional 
tenets opposed to state interference with procreative choices with no corresponding enhancement 
of our society’s interest in securing two-parent support for each child.  At the same time, the 
exclusion undermines significant commitments to consistency and neutrality in the law that are 
the hallmarks of sound social policy.  Therefore, any state considering regulating gestational 
agreements would be well advised not to restrict the ability of unmarried couples to execute such 
86 See Garrison, supra note 24, at __.
87 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 
164, 175 (1972); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 775 (1976); Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 
855 (1986); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982); 
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 
391 U.S. 73 (1968).
88 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
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agreements.  
II. MARRIAGE AND ADOPTION
A.  Adoption and Surrogacy: Comparisons and Contrasts
The question of how surrogacy should be regulated invariably invites comparisons 
between surrogacy, about which little regulation exists,89 and adoption, which is highly 
regulated.  Although the question has been debated for over almost twenty years,90 the extent to 
which surrogacy should track adoption’s regulatory model is still far from settled.91  Some see 
surrogacy and adoption as substantially congruent in their aims and thus adoption as the 
appropriate template for surrogacy.92  Others find important and even stark differences between 
the two that inspire them to reject situating surrogacy within an adoption framework.93
Differences of opinion on this matter appear to depend upon whether one believes 
surrogacy is like adoption because it is not procreative94 or less like adoption because it is.95  In 
89 See Surrogate Mom’s Custody Fight, CBS NEWS, Jul. 9, 2004, available at 
http://search.atomz.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2004); Many States Still Lacking Surrogacy Laws, 
ASSOC. PRESS, June 1, 2004, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5113759.
90 See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209, 212-13 (Ky. 
1986).
91 Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8, 9B U.L.A. __ (2001) (requiring adoption-like home 
study to assess fitness of prospective parents) with LD 1851; 
http://janus.state.me.us/legis/LawMakerWeb/summary.asp?ID=280012496 (bill proposing 
surrogacy regulation dispensing with adoption-like evaluations of parental fitness and best 
interests of the child).  See also Joan Heifetz Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce:  Legal and 
Social Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction, in FAMILIES BY LAW:  AN ADOPTION READER
299, 302 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds. 2004). 
92 See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
93 See, e.g., Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 (Mass. 2001) 
(cited in J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1288 (D. Utah 2002)).
94
 Adoption, a non-procreative quest for parenthood, is not a constitutionally protected right.   
See Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1437 (5th Cir. 1990); S.B. v. L.W., 793 So.2d 656, 662 
(Miss. 2001) (Payne, J., concurring).
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exercising their procreative liberty, coital progenitors benefit from a presumption of fitness and 
need make no showing of their fitness before exercising the parental prerogatives that stem from 
their act of procreation.96  To regulate access to adoption or surrogacy in a particular way, then, 
becomes a question of to what extent the state should be permitted to oversee one’s decision to 
become a parent.  
Surrogacy and adoption are similar in many ways.  Both typically originate with 
infertility, provide methods for establishing legal parentage outside of the context of biological 
relationships,97 and invest one’s intentions to become a parent with legal significance.98 Both 
often involve the presence of third parties in the reproductive process and thus raise questions 
about the importance of genetic and gestational ties to the determination of parentage.  Other 
social-policy questions triggered by both adoption and surrogacy are the value of secrecy over 
transparency, the commodification of children, and the exploitation of women.  Finally, both 
surrogacy and adoption trigger deeply ingrained suspicions and fears about mothers who “reject” 
their children.99
95 It remains the subject of considerable debate whether assisted reproductive techniques are 
exercises of procreative liberty.  There has been no pronouncement binding on all states on this 
issue.  See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).  If surrogacy is a fundamental right, 
then restricting its use to married intending parents is unquestionably inconsistent with 
contemporary American constitutional guarantees.  As discussed above, it is also contrary to 
sound social policy.
96
 J.R. v. Utah, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1284 n.24, 1288 (D. Utah 2002); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, 
CHILDREN OF CHOICE:  FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 31 (1994).
97 See generally, PAUL LAURITZEN, PURSUING PARENTHOOD: ETHICAL ISSUES IN ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTION 119 (1993).
98 MADELYN FREUNDLICH, ADOPTION AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION xii  (2001). The intent to 
parent may not be sufficient to determine parentage in surrogacy cases.  See Belsito v. Clark, 644 
N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1994).
99 In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1238 (N.J. 1988) (surrogacy contract called for termination of 
maternal rights and adoption by father’s wife “regardless of any evaluation of the best interests 
of the child”).
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There is also much to distinguish surrogacy from adoption.100  The most salient 
difference is that adoption begins after a child or fetus already exists; surrogacy, though, is used 
to start the reproductive process in the first place.101  Adoption, a child-focused service, requires 
parental fitness and the child’s best interests to be shown; surrogacy, an adult-focused service, 
requires only a showing of fitness to parent.102  The two are not equally valued by society, given 
the nearly overwhelming desire for and bias in favor of genetically-related children.103  Thus, the 
possibility of a genetic tie to a child born through assisted reproduction may make that choice 
appear more understandable and legitimate in a society that extols consanguineous relationships 
and regards non-consanguineous relationships with suspicion if not derision.104
Since adoption is substantially older than is surrogacy, adoption is at present also much 
more regulated than is assisted reproduction.105  Although existing surrogacy reveals the definite 
influence of adoption law, it is important to note that adoption law typically requires both the 
prospective parents’ fitness and the best interests of the child to be assessed before the adoption 
becomes final.  Existing surrogacy regulation, by contrast, is concerned only with parental 
fitness.  Post-birth assessments of a child’s best interests do not occur under existing surrogacy 
regulation as they do post-placement in adoption. 106
100 See generally JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, 2 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 14.04.
101 See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986).
102 See FREUNDLICH, supra note 98, at 19.
103 See id. at 2-3; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of 
Genetics, in FAMILIES BY LAW:  AN ADOPTION READER 313, 315 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan 
Heifetz Hollinger eds. 2004) (discussing the scope of “genetic essentialism”).
104 See Elizabeth Bartholet, Adoption and the Parental Screening System, in FAMILIES BY LAW, 
supra note 103, at 72, 73; Irving Leon, Nature in Adoptive Parenthood, in FAMILIES BY LAW, 
supra note 103, at 88, 88 (mentioning “the prejudice, often subliminal but pervasive, against 
[nonbiological parenthood] . . . .”).
105 See FREUNDLICH, supra note 98, at 75.
106 See Storrow, supra note 72 at 661 n.446.
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B.  The Role of Marital Status in Adoption Law
Although marriage is not a necessary condition for exercising procreative liberty or for 
benefiting from the powerful presumption that coital progenitors are fit parents who will act in 
their offspring’s best interests, marital status is an important eligibility criterion for both adoption 
and surrogacy.  In both contexts, marital status acts, albeit in different ways, both procedurally as 
a standing requirement and substantively as a measure of parental fitness.  As we saw in Part I, 
surrogacy regulation nearly invariably permits only married couples to employ this method of 
having a child.  Adoption law by and large expresses a preference for married couples.  It 
generally prohibits unmarried couples from adopting an unrelated child jointly,107 but it does 
allow single persons to adopt in the absence of a willing married couple.108  Under the view of 
adoption and surrogacy as mere privileges, legislation denying standing on the basis of marital 
status is not constitutionally suspect, even though it may not satisfy the more exacting rigors of 
interpretivism.  Nonetheless, despite our societal commitment to the institution of marriage, the 
reason why the privilege of adoption is not in all cases reserved for married couples is that such a 
107 But see In re Joseph, 684 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Surr. Ct. 1998) (permitting stranger adoption by 
unmarried couple); In re Carl, 709 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Fam. Ct. 2000).  Courts have allowed two 
individuals not in an intimate relationship to adopt the same child.  See, e.g., In re T., 318 
N.W.2d 200 (Iowa 1982).  In In re A.R., 378 A.2d 87 (N.J. Cty Ct. Prob. Div. 1977), the court 
permitted an unwed father to adopt his own child as a “stepfather” where he was prevented from 
marrying the mother because of her incapacity.  378 A.2d at 89.   A Louisiana court has rejected 
the application of biological parents to adopt their own child.  See In re Meaux, 417 So. 2d 522 
(La. Ct. App. 1982).  
108 See, e.g., Leslie C. v. Maricopa County Juvenile Court, 971 P.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1997).  See 
generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Adoption and the Parental Screening System, in FAMILIES BY 
LAW, supra note 103, at 72, 72; SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 174 (2003).  
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bright-line rule will fail to serve the interests of children in all cases, no matter the view of some 
that institutionalized care is preferable to being raised by unmarried parents.109
Despite the fact that one need not be married to adopt, marriage does impose certain 
constraints on how adoption proceeds.  For example, the spouse of a married person who wishes 
to adopt must join the petition.110 Under step-parent adoption provisions, a parent whose spouse 
wishes to adopt her child need not terminate her parental rights.111 Unmarried couples are 
considered singles, and, as mentioned above, in most jurisdictions are not permitted to adopt 
jointly.  In certain jurisdictions, the legally recognized parent of a child may consent to the 
adoption of the child by the parent’s nonmarital partner.  Known as “[s]econd or co-parent 
adoption,”112 such a procedure could be used where the child is biologically related to the parent 
but could also be employed to permit the unmarried couple to adopt the same child, albeit not 
jointly but in tandem.  New laws in some states may outlaw adoptions by cohabiting unmarried 
couples altogether, even adoption in tandem; the best interests of children is declared by these 
jurisdictions never to lie with unmarried parents.
C.  Step-parent and Second-parent Adoption
The special cases of step-parent and second-parent adoption are especially good lenses 
through which to examine more closely how marital status functions in adoption.  Both step-
109 See William C. Duncan, In Whose Best Interests:  Sexual Orientation and Adoption Law, 31 
CAP. U. L. REV. 787, 788 (2003) (recommending institutionalized care for adoptable children in 
the absence of “ideal” heterosexual married couples). 38 New Eng. L. Rev. 643 
110 HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 908 (1988).
111 See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Second Parent Adoptions Protect Children with Two Mothers or 
Two Fathers, in FAMILIES BY LAW, supra note __, at 235, 235.  
112 Id.
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parent and second-parent adoption result in a child’s having at least two legally recognized 
parents.113
1.  Step-parent Adoption
Step-parent adoption is recognized in all states and permits a parent’s new spouse to 
adopt and become a co-parent of the child.  It is typically engrafted upon an adoption statute as 
an exception to the rule that a child’s former parents’ parental rights must be terminated before 
the adoption can be approved.  The right of the child to inherit from or through the parent whose 
rights are terminated varies from state to state.114
In contrast to the typical adoption trajectory, taking the prospective adoptive couple
through an initial home study, a waiting period, and a post-placement home study before a 
hearing is commenced and a final decree issued,115 step-parent adoption provisions streamline 
the process in order to give great weight to a parent’s spouse’s petition to adopt the child. Most 
significant is that, in contrast to the trend mandating pre- and post-placement home studies in 
adoption cases, such evaluations and even waiting periods are routinely waived in step-parent 
adoption cases,116 unless the adoption is contested.117 Moreover, the duration of the marriage is 
113 See In re Sharon S., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 703 n.2 (2003).
114 Compare 20 PA. C.S. § 2108 (severing right to inherit from natural parent but not other 
natural kin) with MD. ESTATES & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-207(a) (severing right to inherit from 
and through natural parent) and TEX. PROB. CODE § 40 (retaining inheritance rights).  The 
Uniform Probate Code severs the right of adopted children to inherit from and through their 
natural parents except in the case of step-parent adoption.  See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114.
115
 The trend is toward more evaluation of the adoptive couple and the placement, making pre-
and post-placement home studies increasingly mandatory.  
116 See KATZ, supra note 108, at 175; In re Galen, 680 N.E.2d 70, 73 n.2 (Mass. 1997) (citing 
REPORT OF THE CITIZENS’ TASK FORCE ON ADOPTION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS (1996)).  
117 See, e.g., In re Wagner, 1999 WL 689971 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 1999).
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typically of no significance in step-parent adoption,118 though some states do impose a waivable 
requirement that the marriage have endured for at least one year.119
The justification for relaxing or doing away with typical adoption requirements is to take 
account of the fact that the petitioner already lives with the child before an adoption petition is 
filed.120  In this context, it is said that a pre-placement assessment would not “fit the facts” of the 
case.121  Curiously, though, a post-placement study, though it does fit the facts is also not 
required.122  Naturally, such lack of evaluation does not free a court from its responsibility for 
making a best-interests determination in step-parent adoption cases,123 but, without the objective 
evaluations typically required in adoption, the body of evidence available for making such a 
determination will understandably be under the control of the petitioners themselves,124 will thus 
likely reflect only favorably on them,125 and will typically lack assessments by independent child 
welfare professionals.126  Perhaps even more disconcerting is that no one present at the hearing 
will be inspired to ask the court to take judicial notice of studies showing that children are at 
greater risk of harm at the hands of step-parents than they are from biological parents living 
118 See In re Adoption No. 90072022/CAD, 590 A.2d 1094 (Md. Ct. App. 1991); Douglas E. 
Abrams & Sarah H. Ramsey, A Primer on Adoption Law, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Summer 2001, at 
23, 25.
119 See In re Webber, 859 P.2d 1074, 1076 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (construing one-year 
requirement not to be jurisdictional).
120 See In re Adoption No. 90072022/CAD, 590 A.2d 1094, 1095 n.2 (Md. Ct. App. 1991).
121 UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-108(a)(1).
122 UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-110; UTAH CODE § 78-30-3.5.
123 See KATZ, supra note 108, at 175 (“Judicial approval is still required . . . . “).
124 See In re Galen, 680 N.E.2d 70, 72 (Mass. 1997) (noting that in waiver cases the only 
evidence submitted to the court is evidence “submitted by the petitioners”). 
125 See id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
126 See id. at 72.
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together or from a biological parent living without a partner.127  The studies may well not 
contemplate the class of step-parents who desire to adopt their step-children, but a mere desire to 
adopt is insufficient to support a best-interests determination in any adoption context.128
Nonetheless, experts have not hesitated to criticize the relaxation of requirements for step-parent 
adoption as contributing to child abuse in the home.129
It could be said that in relaxing the requirements for adoption, the law is merely pursuing 
the constitutionally mandated presumption that the parent will act in the best interests of her 
child in choosing a new parent for the child.  But granting a legal parent such power would 
appear anomalous, especially since, under the traditional approach, legal parentage does not exist 
in the absence of a genetic, gestational, presumed, or adoptive relationship, and an already 
legally recognized parent, no matter the force of the best-interests presumption, has no power to 
vest a new parent of her choice with any of these.  What this analysis of step-parent adoption 
provisions makes clear, then, is that relaxation of the requirements for adoption in this context is 
due solely to the fact that the legal parent has remarried.  In sharp contrast to the traditional 
adoption trajectory, the quality of the marriage, the duration of the marriage, and especially the 
quality of the step-parent/step-child relationship are virtually irrelevant to the step-parent 
adoption decision.
127 See INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY-ONE 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 17 (2002) [hereinafter WHY MARRIAGE].  Succession 
cases show how a step-parent’s interests can be inimical to their step-children’s.  See, e.g., Via v. 
Putnam, 626 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1995).  Moreover, adoption by a step-parent may impair a child’s 
right to inherit from or through either biological parent and may at the very least create intra-
family disharmony.  See, e.g., In re Brittin, 664 N.E.2d 687 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996).  
128 See Garrison, supra note 24, at 861 (“Even in cases of adoption . . . intentions are insufficient 
to effect a rights transfer . . . . ).
129 See Abrams & Ramsey, supra note 118, at 25.  
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2.  Second-parent Adoption
Second-parent adoption is a procedure whereby a legally recognized parent’s committed 
partner may adopt and become a co-parent of the child.  It is statutorily permitted in some 
states,130 but more typically is justified by provisions authorizing adoption by “any 
individual,”131 liberal construction of step-parent adoption provisions,132 by the clear import of or 
by inferences drawn from other express provisions,133 and by consistency with the policy of 
adoption law.134 Because step-parent adoption provisions are not directly applicable, then, 
second-parent adoption may be unavailable in states where all other types of adoption result in 
the termination of parental rights prior to the final decree.135 Where termination is not statutorily 
mandated, however, but is merely expressed as the usual consequence of an adoption, the theory 
of waiver of statutory rights and benefits permits a court to grant a second-parent adoption with 
130 See Hollinger, supra note 110, at 237.
131 See, e.g., In re R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002); In re Sharon S., 2 Cal. Rptr 3d 699, 
717 (2003); In re E.O.G., 28 Pa. D. & C.4th 262, 265 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1993); In re H.N.R., 666 
A.2d 535, 538 (N.J. Super. 1995); In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 893 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) 
132 See, e.g., In re H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. 1995).
133 See, e.g., In re R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1201 (Pa. 2002) (citing 23 PA. C.S. § 2901) (statute 
provides for waiver of requirements for adoption upon showing that requirement’s purpose has 
otherwise been met or is irrelevant); In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) 
(interpreting “related child” provision); In re Baby Z., 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1091, at **21-
22 (Apr. 24, 1996) (discussing waiver of “statutory parent” requirement).
134 See, e.g., In re Sharon S., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 715-20 (2003); id. 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 729 
(Baxter, J., concurring); In re M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (listing 
state’s interest in stable homes through “permanent placement of children with adoptive 
families” and “legal protections and advantages that a two-parent adoption provides”); In re
E.O.G., 28 Pa. D. & C.4th 262, 265 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1993); In re H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 538 
(N.J. Super. 1995); In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 895 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995); In re Baby Z., 1996 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1091, at *21 (Apr. 24, 1996).
135 See, e.g., In re Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 377 (determining child not to be adoptable because not 
relinquished) (Neb. 2002) In re Sharon S., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 707 (citing Murdock v. Brooks, 38
Cal. 596, 602 (1869)).    
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no effect on the original parent’s rights.136  In all, second-parent adoption is recognized in 
twenty-eight states.137  A handful of other states has concluded that second-parent adoptions are 
not authorized under the adoption laws of those states but otherwise declines to express any 
opinion about whether such adoptions could serve the best interests of children.138 Several 
states, though, have made affirmative strikes against second-parent adoption.  Florida explicitly 
outlaws adoption by gay and lesbian persons,139 Mississippi bans adoption by same-gender 
couples,140 and Utah bans adoption by unmarried cohabiting couples.141  Oklahoma denies full 
recognition of adoptions by gay and lesbian couples in other states by restricting adoption to no 
more than one person of the same sex.142  Administrative-agency rules in Arkansas and Nebraska 
disqualify gays and lesbians from serving as foster parents, effectively preventing them from 
adopting children in state care.143
Although analogous to step-parent adoption, second-parent adoption does not require the 
parent to be married to the party seeking to adopt the child.  Thus, second-parent adoption is in 
most jurisdictions the only mechanism an individual can use to adopt his or her partner’s 
136 See, e.g., In re Sharon S. 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 707, 708, 712.  
137 Id., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 719 n.21 (2003).
138 See, e.g., In re Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002). 
139 FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
140 MISS. STAT. § 93-17-3(2).
141 UTAH CODE § 78-30-1(b).  The Utah legislation was passed to prevent judges from construing 
the broad language of the adoption statute as permitting second-parent adoptions.  Critics of 
these “stealth” adoptions considered them beyond the scope of the legislatively conferred 
authority to grant adoptions, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Dec. 31, 2000, and as per se not in a child’s 
best interest, UTAH CODE § 78-30-9(3)(a).  The new legislation prohibits any unmarried and 
cohabiting couple from adopting a child jointly or any single person from adopting his 
cohabiting partner’s child. UTAH CODE § 78-30-1(b). “Cohabiting” is specifically defined in the 
statute as living together and having a sexual relationship. UTAH CODE § 78-30-1(b).  The statute 
does not expressly forbid adoptions by committed partners living in separate residences and 
would appear to allow kinship adoptions by relatives living in the same household.  
142
 10 OKLA. STAT. 2001 § 7502-1.4(A).
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children.  For gay and lesbian couples, who cannot marry in most jurisdictions, second-parent 
adoption is the only way to provide children protections they would otherwise achieve through 
step-parent adoption.  This legal device has been described as consistent with the reality of 
children’s lives and calculated to forge the strongest legal bond possible between a child and 
those functioning as his parent.144
Commentators opposed to second-parent adoption opine that it is contrary to children’s 
best interests,145 beyond the competence of family court judges,146 and even immoral.147  Other 
commentators accuse grants of second-parent adoption petitions to be devoid of any serious 
inquiry into the best interests of the child, based on an erroneous view of adoption as a 
fundamental right, and precursors of “new and bizarre” family structures that will inexorably 
lead to judicial recognition of three-, four-, and five-parent families.
D.  Parental Fitness and Children’s Interests
From a policy perspective, it is impossible not to discern the wide gulf between 
streamlined step-parent adoption cases where a perfunctory if any best-interests inquiry takes 
place and blanket prohibitions on second-parent adoption.  If nothing more, setting up a 
143 See http://www.aclu.org/LesbianGayRights/LesbianGayRights.cfm?ID=15293&c=104
144 See In re Sharon S., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 716 (2003) (no suggestion made by any party, 
amicus, or court that second-parent adoption cannot achieve the objectives of adoption); id., 2 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 715-16 (cataloging legal and nonlegal benefits to children adopted through 
second-parent adoption).  
145 See Duncan, supra note 109, at 800; Lynn Wardle, The Potential Impact  of Homosexual 
Parenting on Children, 1997 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 833, 882.  
Duncan and Wardle also attack second-parent adoption as a restyling of adoption as a 
fundamental right, see Duncan, supra note 109, at 801, and exaggerations, see Wardle, Potential 
Impact, supra note 145, at 883, i.e., questioning how these extra-legal configurations of adults 
and children could be characterized as families.  
146 In re D.J.L., 16 S.W.3d 263 (Ark. 2000).  Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 145, at 882 
(“conclusory”).
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procedural obstacle to adoption deprives the court of making the individualized assessments that 
we know the best-interests inquiry contemplates.148  Inevitably, into this gulf fall children who 
would benefit from being adopted by a second parent rather than otherwise never having two 
legal parents and thus whose best interests could be served by the adoption.  This is particularly 
poignant in cases of artificial insemination where as a matter of law in many jurisdictions and as 
a practical matter in others a child has only one legal parent.149  An argument for harmonizing 
the law of step-parent and second-parent adoption follows.  
1.  Streamlining: Parental Fitness by Proxy
Emerging from the sketch of how step-parent adoption works is the sense that marriage 
alone acts as a virtual proxy for or at the very least a presumption in favor of a child’s best 
interests.  Marriage embodies the notion of the permanent, loving home that every child 
deserves.  By contrast, the absence of marriage carries with it no such notion/and at worst that 
the child will suffer untold indignities that will be visited on society at large.  This role for 
marriage is certainly not unknown in other areas of family law and could be explained as 
consistent with our existing legal tradition in two different ways.  First, a parent’s marriage to 
someone who is not also the parent of her child could be said to raise a presumption of parentage 
similar to marital-presumption parentage.  This presumption, in turn, raises the presumption that 
the presumed parent acts in the best interests of his child.  The court can then take notice of this 
presumption and grant the adoption in the absence of any evidence that would undermine the 
presumption.  This explanation of the existence of streamlining in step-parent adoption is 
147 CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Feb. 24, 2000.
148 See Abrams & Ramsey, supra note 118, at 25 (noting that the best-interests standard looks to 
what “will best promote the welfare of the particular child”).
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admittedly convoluted and forced.  More convincing as an explanation might simply be that the 
presumption that legal parents act in the best interests of their children validates the legal 
parent’s choice of another parent for her child as in that child’s best interests in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary.  Both approaches suggest that as long as there is marriage, very little in 
the way of further inquiry is needed to validate the adoption.  
Given that neither of the presumptions just described has ever functioned in this way in 
family law, neither of the foregoing explanations justifies streamlining in step-parent adoption.  
First, marital-presumption parentage requires that the child be born to the marriage so as to lend 
credence to what it supposes about procreative facts; in the step-parent adoption context, then, 
the most basic premise behind marital-presumption parentage is absent.  If marital-presumption 
parentage cannot be made to fit a possibly procreative context like surrogacy,150 it certainly 
cannot be made to fit adoption, which wholly lacks any procreative aspect.  Second, the 
presumption that a parent acts in the best interest of her child is not a presumption that 
establishes parentage but one that arises from an already recognized parent-child relationship.  
The presumption is inoperative where no genetic tie or already decreed adoption exists.  Thus, 
the presumption has no application to a pending adoption matter. 
Just as a marriage requirement in the context of surrogacy fails to serve any justifiable 
purpose or raise any presumptions that we associate with marriage, streamlining on the basis of 
marriage in step–parent adoption cases is similarly unprincipled because it as well has no basis in 
familiar parentage presumptions and does not comport with the need to evaluate rigorously the 
best interests of the child in every adoption case.  
149 See In re Sharon S., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 716, 718 n.19 (2003).
150 See Part I, supra.
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2.  Making Children Unadoptable: In Whose Interest?
In contrast to streamlining of the procedures undertaken in step-parent adoption cases, 
where inquiry into the best interest of the child is perfunctory at best, second-parent adoption, 
where permitted, requires the full range of evaluations of the adopted child’s best interests to 
take place.  This approach seems consistent with focusing on the interests of children in adoption 
cases instead of on the relationship or interests of the prospective parents151 and is, moreover, 
consistent with the methods that have traditionally been used to achieve those interests.  Where 
second-parent adoption is not permitted, only by marrying her domestic partner may an 
individual be deemed fit to adopt and become a co-parent of the domestic partner’s child.  As we 
have already seen, however, marriage is not a suitable proxy for parental fitness or for children’s 
best interests.  As we will see below, second-parent adoption is the only way some children can 
ever hope to have two legally recognized parents.  The refusal to allow second-parent adoption, 
or even to make it a more burdensome procedure than step-parent adoption, then, seems more 
geared toward granting privileges to married couples than toward ensuring the best interests of 
children.  
Contrary to the criticisms of second-parent adoption, an examination of second-parent 
adoption cases reveals the courts’ painstaking and probing examination of the circumstances of 
the individual children in each and every case in search of the decision that will most promote 
the best interests of the child.  Despite the clear analogy to step-parent adoption procedures,152
151 See In re R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1198 (Pa. 2002); In re E.O.G., 28 Pa. D. & C.4th 262, 265 
(Ct. Comm. Pleas 1993).  
152 See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Second Parent Adoptions Protect Children with Two Mothers or 
Two Fathers, in FAMILIES BY LAW, supra note 110, at 235, 235; In re Galen, 680 N.E.2d 70, 73 
n.2 (Mass. 1997) (citing REPORT OF THE CITIZENS’ TASK FORCE ON ADOPTION FOR THE 
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there is never any waiver of home studies or waiting periods of the sort we see in that context.
Even where the law provides a mechanism whereby a second-parent adoption petitioner may 
apply for a waiver, invariably such requests must be supported by “numerous affidavits and 
letters attesting to the longevity and strength of the relationship between the prospective adopters 
and legal memoranda in support of such a waiver . . . .”153 By contrast, a step-parent’s request 
for a waiver is almost always routinely granted with no supporting documentation.154 Moreover, 
the evaluations required often include a costly bonding assessment by a licensed psychologist in 
addition to the significantly less expensive home study by a social worker.  Invariably, courts 
hearing these petitions focus on the financial benefits that will accrue to the child, including 
support, inheritance rights, Social Security benefits and health insurance155 and on the emotional 
benefits a child reaps from adoption.156  But beyond this, the courts recognize that these 
adoptions differ significantly from stranger adoptions.  A child is not being “reborn” into a new 
family where all ties to his prior family are erased.  Instead, “the children’s existing familial 
bonds” are respected and given legal recognition.157  Nothing about how the child experiences 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS (1996)) (describing step-parent adoption as second-parent 
adoption’s closest model); In re Baby Z., 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1091, at *21 (Apr. 24, 
1996).
153 See In re Galen, 680 N.E.2d 70, 73 n.2 (Mass. 1997) (citing REPORT OF THE CITIZENS’ TASK 
FORCE ON ADOPTION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS (1996)).  
154 See id.
155 In re R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1198 (Pa. 2002); In re E.O.G., 28 Pa. D. & C.4th 262, 266 (Ct. 
Comm. Pleas 1993); In re M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (also listing 
disability insurance and education, housing, and nutrition assistance); In re Baby Z., 1996 Conn. 
Super. LEXIS 1091, at *5 (Apr. 24, 1996).
On the question of how second-parent adoption affects inheritance rights under the UPC, 
see JESSE DUKEMINER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 105 (6th ed. 
2000). 
156 In re Baby Z., 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1091, at **4, 5, 6 (Apr. 24, 1996).
157 In re R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1198; see also In re H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 541 (N.J. Super. 1995); 
In re Baby Z., 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1091, at *4 n.5 (Apr. 24, 1996).
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love, care, and commitment changes after these adoptions except for the greater assurance of 
continuity of love, care and commitment that accompanies an adoption decree.158 The effort is 
plainly to afford the children involved the greatest legal protections in the most permanent, 
stable, supportive, and nurturing home these children can hope to have.159
None of these cases proceeds along the lines of vindicating the petitioner’s “right” to 
adopt the child.160  Completely absent from these decisions is any sense that the marital status of 
these committed couples is in any way contrary to the best interests of the children, or that it 
renders the petitioners unfit to be parents.  On the other hand, in contrast to the step-parent cases, 
where the marriage itself appears to establish a right to adopt the child, courts in second-parent 
cases remain open to hearing evidence that living in the home of a same-sex couple will harm the 
children, and they seek to balance whatever “negative effects” might be present with the benefits 
to be acquired.161  Such a painstaking balancing of the factors is utterly absent from step-parent 
cases, where the fact of marriage alone renders the otherwise mandatory best-interests inquiry 
superfluous.      
Critics of second-parent adoption are more concerned with finding new ways to bolster 
the privileged position of married couples in society than they are with promoting the best 
interests of each and every child according to his or her personal circumstances.  Brigham Young 
family law professor Lynn Wardle, for example, was among those who testified in favor of 
158 In re E.O.G., 28 Pa. D. & C.4th 262 267 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1993); In re H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 
541 (N.J. Super. 1995).
159 See, e.g., In re Sharon S., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 715-16 (2003) (cataloging legal and nonlegal 
benefits for children adopted by a second parent); In re Baby Z., 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
1091, at *37 (Apr. 24, 1996).
160 See In re Sharon S., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 716, 720-21 (2003) (partner not seeking to adopt based 
on past relationship as caregiver).  
161 In re E.O.G., 28 Pa. D. & C.4th 262, 267 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 1993).
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Utah’s adoption ban.  At the time, Wardle described having been troubled that a number of Utah 
judges were sympathetic to gay and lesbian couples who sought legal recognition of the parent-
and-child relationships within their families.162  The resulting law definitively pronounces that it 
is never in the best interest of any child to have unmarried parents.  This pronouncement 
effectively serves as a standing requirement preventing a cohabitant from petitioning to adopt a 
child as a second parent.  The requirement preempts a fact-based inquiry into the best interests of 
the child in question.
More recently, Wardle has claimed the ban is justified because at any given time in Utah 
there are enough married couples petitioning to adopt all of Utah’s adoptable children.163
Wardle neglects to mention that second-parent adoption petitions are never brought for the 
adoption of children in state custody.  Rather, second-parent adoption petitions are brought by 
individuals who seek to adopt and become a co-parent of a domestic partner’s child.  What 
Wardle would like to overlook is that the children who are the subject of second-parent adoption 
petitions are extremely unlikely ever to be available for adoption by a married couple.  Most of 
these cases involve artificial insemination using donor sperm of women who with their partners 
planned and prepared for the conception, birth and rearing of this child.164  In all of these cases, 
both women have reared the children since birth, and so it is unsurprising that the children have 
162 See SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Dec. 31, 2000. 
163
 Conversation at Conference on Adoption and the Family System, Brigham Young University, 
September 25, 2003.  
164 See, e.g., In re R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1198 (Pa. 2002); In re Galen, 680 N.E.2d 70, 71 
(Mass. 1997); In re H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 536 (N.J. Super. 1995); In re Baby Z., 1996 Conn. 
Super. LEXIS 1091, at *2 (Apr. 24, 1996).  See Hollinger, supra note 110, at 235.  
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bonded with and consider both of them to be their parents.165  Even more than in step-parent 
cases, where the step-parent more than likely has not been committed to or reared the child since 
his or her birth, the adoptions in second-parent adoption cases seem tailor-made to promote the 
child’s best interests.166
In the academic literature, Wardle has assumed a different stance toward second-parent 
adoption than he did when he testified before the Utah Legislature.  Writing on the “least 
detrimental alternative” approach to adoption in the 1997 edition of the Illinois Law Review, 
Wardle conceded that certain “less-than-perfect . . . adoption arrangements are the best options 
for a particular child,” even if those arrangements are “exceptional cases” involving “less-than-
ideal parents.”167  Unfortunately, Wardle did not bring his scholarly opinion to the attention of 
the Utah Legislature in 2000 when he lobbied against permitting adoption even in such 
exceptional cases.  The result of his legislative advocacy is that Utah courts are no longer 
permitted to consider even the least detrimental alternative in second-parent adoption cases, 
since an unmarried cohabitant can no longer achieve standing to bring an adoption petition in the 
first instance.  Second-parent adoptions are altogether prohibited.  
Restrictions on standing to petition to adopt, under any microscope, seem extraordinary, 
especially given that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in any adoption.168
Courts agree with the professor in Wardle that the possibility that a “least detrimental 
alternative” exists in any given case means that standing to petition to adopt should be liberal in 
165 See, e.g., In re Sharon S., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 704 (2003); In re Galen, 680 N.E.2d 70, 74 
(Mass. 1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The child is already united with his mother, having 
lived with her since birth.”); In re H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 541 (N.J. Super 1995).
166 See In re H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 537, 539 (N.J. Super. 1995); Hollinger, supra note 110, at 
236. 
167
 Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 145, at 882-83.
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scope to permit courts to assess “the potential [of the applicant] to successfully parent a child in 
foster care or adoption.”169  Even the Utah Supreme Court has embraced the least-detrimental-
alternative ethic by stating that the issue in every adoption should be 
whether children who are subject to adoption have a right to have as adoptive parents 
those who may be the only people who can give the children the reasonable nurture, care,
guidance, and love as a foundation for realizing their highest potential as human 
beings.170
Although recognizing the prerogative of the legislature “to determine how the most basic social 
unit in society should be organized,” 171 the court nonetheless described adoption as “the kind of 
case in which a trial judge should not be bound by . . . rigid standards.”172  In short, the court 
recognized that the best interests inquiry is “fact-specific”--one focusing on whether “the 
interests of these children will [] be promoted by permitting their adoption by these 
petitioners.”173  As such, “a blanket exclusion” of an entire of class of persons from standing is 
simply bad public policy.174
168 See In re W.A.T., 808 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Utah 1991).
169 In re Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 384 (Neb. 2002) (Gerrard, J., dissenting) (quoting county 
court’s order) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170 In re W.A.T., 808 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J., concurring).
171 Id., 808 P.2d at 1087 (Stewart, J., concurring).  In Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 
(S.D. Fla. 2001), the court, applying the rational-basis test in response to a constitutional 
challenge, upheld a ban on petitions for adoption brought by gays and lesbians.  See 157 F. Supp. 
2d at 1383, aff’d sub nom. Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 
F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).   
172 Id., 808 P.2d at 1087 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id., 808 P.2d at 1085 (describing the 
role of the trial court in the “highly sensitive area of child adoption); Jane S. Schacter, 
Constructing Families in a Democracy:  Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 942 (2000) (discussing the “functional justifications [that] support this 
institutional design”).       
173 Id., 808 P.2d at 1086.
174 Id.; cf. In re E, 279 A.2d 785, 789, 796 (N.J. 1971) (reversing trial court’s determination that 
petitioners were unfit to adopt given their lack of belief in a “Supreme Being”).
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Since legal protection of child welfare was not Professor Wardle primary concern when 
he advocated for adoption reform in Utah, he presumably also supports Oklahoma’s new policy 
of nullifying the legal tie between a child and a gay or lesbian parent who has adopted the child 
in another state.   
Were critics like Wardle at all concerned about child welfare, they would devote their 
energy to promoting two-parent support for every child rather than fomenting disapproval of gay 
and lesbian couples and diminished legal protections for their children.  Even if Wardle’s 
legislative priorities were congruent with his academic ones, he has demonstrated that in the final 
analysis he favors depriving certain children of the chance to have two legally recognized parents 
if doing so adds luster to the meaning of marriage.  As we will see below, Wardle’s views in this 
regard are consistent with those of others within what has become known as “the marriage 
movement.”
III.  THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT
The American marriage movement is a loose amalgam of initiatives reacting to the 
decline of the heterosexual, marital nuclear family,175 defined as a heterosexual married couple 
raising the children born to the two of them in one household.  The movement views 
heterosexual marriage as central to societal integrity and aims to identify and dismantle or deflect 
any forces that threaten its primacy.  To accomplish this aim, the movement pursues two 
objectives: (1) strengthening the status of heterosexual marriage in the formulation of social 
175 See DAVID POPENOE, DISTURBING THE NEST: FAMILY CHANGE AND DECLINE IN MODERN 
SOCIETIES 34 (1988), cited in David Blankenhorn, REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW COMMITMENT 
TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY 14 (David Blankenhorn, Steven Bayme, et al., eds., 1990)  
 [hereinafter REBUILDING].  See also Blankenhorn, Marriage Problem, supra note 73, at 61.
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policy; and (2) assisting individual heterosexual couples in contracting enduring and satisfying 
marriages.176 In general, the movement targets any family system, legal mechanism, or social 
force that undermines or stands as an  alternative to heterosexual marriage.  Specific targets
consist largely of manifestations of “individualism”:  no-fault divorce, same-sex marriage, 
unmarried and single parenthood, and stepparent families.177
This Part offers a close reading of the literature of the marriage movement and argues 
that the claims of the movement, presented as broad, encompassing, and up-to-date, are in 
actuality much narrower and more retrograde than they are made to appear.  First, the 
movement’s articulation of the important public role of marriage—the glue which holds the 
whole of society together—is based on functions that no longer have currency in contemporary 
postindustrial society.  Second, the form of marriage the movement seeks to reinvigorate has 
been deemed violative of the equality principles of a civilized society.  Perhaps most surprising 
is the movement’s position on children.  Like Professor Wardle’s stand on second-parent 
adoption, children’s welfare, although figuring prominently in the marriage movement’s 
176 David Blankenhorn accuses critics of the marriage movement of “undermin[ing] the 
possibility of evaluating a collective interest in marriage” by improperly shifting the terms of the 
dialogue “from a sociological and anthropological discussion of marriage as an institution to a 
therapeutic discussion of individual (good and bad) marriages . . . .”  Blankenhorn, Marriage 
Problem, supra note 73, at 68.  This Article focuses solely on marriage as an institution; the pre-
and post-marital counseling initiatives of the marriage movement are beyond its scope.  
On the objectives of church-based community marriage initiatives, see Paul James Birch, 
Stan E. Weed, and Joseph A. Olsen, Assessing the Impact of Community Marriage Policies on 
U.S. County Divorce Rates, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.smartmarriages.com.  For an 
account of the beginnings of “The Marriage Enrichment Movement,” see David R. Mace, The 
Marriage Enrichment Movement, in PREVENTION IN FAMILY SERVICES:  APPROACHES TO FAMILY 
WELLNESS 98 (David R. Mace ed. 1983). 
177 BLANKENHORN, REBUILDING, supra note 175, at 10-11(indicating individualism as the 
primary contributor to moral decay because of its damage to marriage, societal integrity, and 
child welfare); Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Decline of Marriage as the Social Basis of 
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literature, turns out at best to be of secondary concern and at worst to be antithetical to the 
movement’s primary objective of elevating the position of married couples by any means 
available.  
A. Historical Antecedents of the Marriage Movement
From a historical perspective, there has perhaps always been a marriage movement.  
Marriage has played an important role in the development of both Western and Eastern 
civilization, although it has taken on different forms and functions throughout history.  The 
ancient Egyptians and Israelites revered marriage as did the ancient Greeks and Romans.  In 
American history, heterosexual marriage has been extolled as “‘the foundation of the family,’”178
as essential to the advancement of civilization,179 to democracy,180 to the propagation of 
humanity,181 and to economic prosperity.182  Not surprisingly, the law has for a long time favored 
Childrearing, in PROMISES, supra note 27, at 3, 12 (explaining that children may be resentful of 
or hostile to a stepparent).  
178 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 
211 (1888)).
179 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS:  A HISTORY 
OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 17-18, 26, 46, 77, 116-18, 121, 219 (2000); Carl E. Schneider, 
The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 502 (1992) (quoting JAMES 
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 156 (1967)).
180 See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Marriage:  Why a Second Tier Called Covenant Marriage? 12 
REGENT UNIV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999).
181 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage and procreation are 
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 
1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (“[M]arriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily because 
of societal values associated with the propagation of the human race.”).
182 See Bashaw v. State, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 177 (1829); Maddox v. Maddox, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 804 
(1854) (describing marriage, and its concomitant procreation, as essential to national prosperity); 
see also COTT, supra note 182,  at 81-82, 121, 157, 179; Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility 
and Commitment to Children:  The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 1111, 1159 (1999) (quoting testimony from 1996 House of Representatives’s Defense of 
Marriage Act debates describing the “traditional [marital] family as the foundation of prosperity 
and happiness”); Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of Children:  Recapturing the Meaning of 
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and continues to favor the institution of marriage.  In order to promote marriage,183 the law 
provides easy access to marriage by opposite-sex couples,184 fosters harmony within existing 
marriages,185 and, when marriages end in divorce, encourages the parties to remarry.186  These 
same ideas, along with the message that marriage is divinely sanctioned,187 are also present in 
religious perspectives on marriage.188
B.  The Work of the Marriage Movement
The contemporary American marriage movement’s primary appeal to history is the view 
that marriage has been revered by every society and has played a critical role in the development 
of civilization.  Instead of focusing and elaborating on the meaning of marriage throughout 
history, however, the movement devotes its energy to championing the marital American family 
of the early to mid-1960s and expresses concern about contemporary trends away from that 
Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1551 n.10 (1998) (“[T]he link . . . between a healthy 
family and a robust economy . . . is clear and firm.”  (quoting Daniel Yankelovich, Foreign 
Policy After the Election, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 3-4 (1992))).   
183 See Stubbs v. Ortega, 977 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tex. App. 1998) (“[I]t is still the public policy of 
this state to foster and protect marriage and to discourage divorce. . . .”).
184 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1987) (holding a state may not refuse to 
allow prisoners to marry except for compelling reasons); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389-
90 (1978) (holding a state may not condition permission to marry on compliance with a child 
support order); Regan, supra note 70, at 652, 655 (1999) (describing the present application of a 
more demanding level of scrutiny to state regulation of marriage than was applied forty years 
ago).
185 See Niemann v. Niemann, 317 S.E.2d 472, 474 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (“[P]ublic policy relating 
to marriage is to foster and protect it.”).
186 See In re Wagner, 159 A.2d 495, 499 (Pa. 1960) (noting “the policy of looking with favor 
upon remarriage”).  To reconcile the policy favoring remarriage with the policy disfavoring 
divorce, the law developed the nisi divorce decree, which delays the divorce decree becoming 
absolute in order to provide both “a cooling-off period to encourage reconciliation” and the 
prevention of immediate remarriage.  Ladd v. Ladd, 640 A.2d 29, 33 (Vt. 1994) (Morse, J., 
dissenting).
187 See OLTHUIS, supra note 52, at 20.
188 See, e.g., FOSTER, supra note 52, at 6.
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model.189  The marriage problem we face today, in short, is that, since the early 1960s, American 
society has undergone an alarming shift from “familism” to “individualism,”190 and the price of 
this has been the decline of marriage.    
The early work of the contemporary marriage movement was in reaction to the “divorce 
culture” of the United States.  The divorce culture was a product of the increasing individualism 
in American society and was embraced optimistically as an antidote to unhappiness.191 The 
marriage movement published research on the detrimental effects of divorce on individuals and 
society (even stepfamilies and remarriage were said to be detrimental) and lobbied for more 
restrictive divorce laws, covenant marriage, and preferential welfare regulation for the married 
poor.192  In particular, the movement has pointed to feminism and two-career couples as having 
injurious effects on marriage and the family.193 More recently, the movement has expressed 
concern over cohabitation and single parenthood, said to be among the deleterious fallout of the 
divorce culture.  Undergirding all of the marriage movement’s initiatives is the call “to create 
189 See David Blankenhorn, American Family Dilemmas, in BLANKENHORN, REBUILDING, supra 
note 175, at 8-9 (describing “the dimensions and consequences of changes in the family during 
the past quarter century” as the primary point at issue between opponents in the current 
discussion about marriage and the family).
190
 Blankenhorn, Marriage Problem, supra note 73, at 61.
191 See Maggie Gallagher, Re-creating Marriage, in PROMISES, supra note 27, at 233, 234.  
192
 Joanna Alexandra Norland, When the Vow Breaks: Why the History of French Divorce Law 
Sounds a Warning about the Implications for Women of the Contemporary American Marriage 
Movement, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 321, 342 (2002) (detailing initiatives); Nina Bernstein, Strict 
Limits on Welfare Benefits Discourage Marriage, Studies Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2002, at A1.  
http://patriot.net/~crouch/pro.html (divorce reform web site).
193
 Graglia, Non-Feminist, supra note 71, at 995, 996, 1002; BRIAN C. ROBERTSON, THERE'S NO 
PLACE LIKE WORK: HOW BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND OUR OBSESSION WITH WORK HAVE 
DRIVEN PARENTS FROM HOME; DON BROWNING, MARRIAGE AND MODERNIZATION:  HOW 
GLOBALIZATION THREATENS MARRIAGE AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 162 (2003) [hereinafter 
BROWNING, MODERNIZATION]; Don Browning, MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A COMMUNITARIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 109, 297 (Martin King Whyte ed. 2000) [hereinafter COMMUNITARIAN]. 
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and lead a marriage movement that spans the world.” 194
The claims of the marriage movement that are of particular relevance to the current 
discussion are (1) that marriage is the building block of society, (2) that marriage contributes to 
the well being of children and (3) marriage is currently in crisis.  Each of these will be examined 
in turn.
1.  Marriage Is the Building Block of Society
Building upon the historical evidence that marriage has played an central role in the 
organization of society going back millennia195 and upon the conviction that marriage has been 
essential to the trajectory of civilization196 and continues to ensure the integrity of society,197 a
basic tenet of the marriage movement is that marriage is not simply a personal choice grounded 
in the right to privacy but is an important social good.198  The individual goods that accrue in 
larger measure to heterosexual married couples than to unmarried persons—primarily physical 
and mental health, physical security, sexual satisfaction, and wealth—ensure a healthy, happy 
194 See David Blankenhorn, Should Public Policy Favor Marriage and Children?, THE FAMILY 
IN AMERICA, Sept. 2000, at 1, 7 [hereinafter Blankenhorn, Public Policy]; see also COUNCIL ON 
FAMILIES IN AMERICA, MARRIAGE IN AMERICA:  A REPORT TO THE NATION 3 (1995) (calling for 
rebuilding “a family culture based on enduring marital relationships”) [hereinafter MARRIAGE IN 
AMERICA]. 
195 See Blankenhorn, Public Policy, supra note 194, at 6; INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, 
WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY-ONE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 6, 18 
(2002) [hereinafter WHY MARRIAGE].
196 See MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 194, at 4 (describing marriage as “the institution 
which most effectively teaches the civic virtues of honesty, loyalty, trust, self-sacrifice, personal 
responsibility, and respect for others . . . .”).  
197 See Carl Hulse, Senate Hears Testimony on a Gay Marriage Amendment, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 
2004, at A22 (“[M]arriage is a key social institution.”) (reporting testimony of Federal Marriage 
Amendment proponents).  
198 INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY-ONE CONCLUSIONS 
FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 6, 18 (2002) [hereinafter WHY MARRIAGE].
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citizenry.199  But more than this, marriage generates “social capital”--inter-family and 
intergenerational bonds that embed married couples and their children within larger social 
networks and direct their efforts to the good of all.200  By contrast, the unmarried lack the 
significant family support that would devolve to them from their combined kinship groups acting 
on the coded obligations that “being married” triggers.201  In sum, marriage “has a [beneficially] 
transformative effect on [the] attitudes and behavior” of society as a whole, so much so that 
some marriage-movement commentators have dubbed marriage a “seedbed[] of American 
democracy.”202
Since societal integrity depends on marriage, threats to marriage create the risk of 
society’s downfall.203 On a small scale, contemporary divorce culture makes unmarried and 
married people alike unhappy, lonely, and increasingly suspicious of any form of 
commitment.204  But on a larger scale, divorce, nonmarital births, the absence of fathers, and the 
deinstitutionalization of marriage–called collectively “family disruption”–exacerbate world 
199 See id. at 9-10, 13-14, 14-15, 16-17.  See generally LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, 
THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:  WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF 
FINANCIALLY (2000).   
200 See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, Subcommittee on Children and Families, April 28, 
2004, available at 
http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/Print/Print%20Whitehead%20TESTIMONY.htm
[hereinafter, Whitehead, Testimony]. 
201 See id.
202
 David Blankenhorn, Conclusion, in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE:  SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, 
CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 271, 274, 280 (Mary Ann Glendon & 
David Blankenhorn eds. 1995).
203
 Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, 271 ATL. MONTHLY 47 (Apr. 1993)
[hereinafter Whitehead, Dan Quayle]. 
204 See MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 194, at 7.
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hunger, overpopulation, destruction of the environment, and AIDS.205 Some believe that this 
disruption results from forces such as individualism, modernization and globalization.206 Given 
the importance of marriage as the building block of society, all marriage-movement 
commentators call on the government to promote marriage.207
2.  Marriage Contributes to the Well Being of Children
Since marriage is essential to societal integrity, it naturally has an important public 
function from which all of society, including children as a class, benefit.  But marriage also plays 
an important private role in the lives of individual children.  For over a decade, the marriage 
movement has asserted that the quality of life of American children grows worse each year.208
This is said to be due to the devaluation of children and child rearing resulting from our 
divestment from marriage.209 According to the marriage movement, the intact, biological 
married family is the setting in which individual children do best.  Children raised in step-parent, 
single-parent, adoptive, or gay or lesbian households do not fare nearly as well.  In the adoption 
context, the movement urges restriction to adoption to married couples but does not oppose 
adoption by single persons.  The movement does, however, oppose the trend toward open 
adoption in domestic placements.  To the extent the movement acknowledges the blended 
205 BROWNING, MODERNIZATION, supra note 193, at 31.  Although marriage is believed to 
contribute to economic prosperity, see supra note 182 and accompanying text, the crisis in 
marriage has not been linked with an economic downturn.  Indeed, to some, it seems likely that 
the individualistic impulses that give momentum to the economy are likely to cause workers to 
devalue marital ties.  Moreover, a weak economy can wreak havoc even on otherwise strong 
marital and familial ties.  See ALAN WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM 48 (2001) (noting the linkage 
between the workplace and marital disloyalty).
206 BROWNING, MODERNIZATION, supra note 193, at 1, 9-10, 41, 215.
207 See, e.g., Whitehead, Testimony, supra note 200; Blankenhorn, Public Policy, supra note 194, 
at 7.
208 See, e.g., David Blankenhorn, Introduction, in REBUILDING, supra note 175, at xiv.
209 Id. at 8.  
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families that result from divorce, it believes “[c]hildren who live with a parent and stepparent do 
not fare much better than children who live with a single parent.”210  For this reason, the 
movement approves of married stepparent adoptions, since they provide even greater certainty 
for the child than does the mere remarriage of his parent.  The movement does not, however, 
approve of second-parent adoptions by same-sex partners.
All of these positions are subsumed in the movement’s goal to reinscribe marriage “as the unique 
repository of sexual life and procreation”211 and its advocacy for social policies that promote 
childbearing and child rearing within a marital, nuclear-family structure.  
The deleterious effects of divorce on children are of particular concern to the marriage 
movement.212  In general, children of divorce have a tendency to disbelieve in the permanency of 
relationships; they consequently experience varying degrees of insecurity in their lives, including 
an inability to make meaningful connection with other human beings.213  Not only does divorce 
harm children, but so does being raised by cohabiting, same-sex, or single parents.  Like children 
of divorce, such children experience disadvantages that haunt them well into their adult lives.  
These disadvantages lead such children to make anti-marriage choices that then send damaging 
ripple effects into society for generations to come.  
In an effort to disseminate widely the message that marriage benefits children and non-
marriage, the Institute for American Values published Why Marriage Matters: Twenty-One 
210 See MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 5 (Martin King Whyte ed., 
2000).
211 See INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, THE EXPERTS’ STORY OF COURTSHIP 8 (2000).
212 See MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 194, at 4, 6.
213 See INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT:  A STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES 4 (noting that children whose parents divorced are more likely to divorce) 
[hereinafter STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES].  
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Conclusions from the Social Sciences.214 Why Marriage Matters discusses social-science studies 
of the effects of family disruption and how the conclusions we can draw from those studies 
suggest the need for a renewed commitment to marriage.  Why Marriage Matters laments that 
children who grow up with unmarried parents increases the likelihood that those children will 
have no relationship with their fathers and that, later in life, they will themselves divorce or 
become unwed parents.215  These children are more likely than children with married parents to 
experience poverty, to achieve less educationally and professionally, and to suffer substance 
abuse.216  They are less physically and emotionally healthy217 and are more likely to commit 
criminal acts and commit suicide.218
 Since heterosexual marriage is the institution “most likely to meet children’s needs and 
safeguard their interests,”219 the marriage movement advocates revitalizing this battered 
institution in a form in which the interests of children come first.220
3.  Marriage Is Currently in Crisis
For all the good that marriage brings to society and to children, it nonetheless is, says the 
marriage movement, currently suffering a crisis that threatens to destroy our way of life.  The 
root of the crisis is that marriage is no longer perceived as a union based on self-sacrifice and 
duty, but simply one meant to last only so long as each member of the married couple 
experiences personal satisfaction.  In other words, marriage has lost its reputation as serving an 
important public function and has become just another way of pursuing private ends.  Against 
214 WHY MARRIAGE, supra note 198, at 4.
215 See id. at 7, 8. 
216 See id. at 9, 10, 11, 12
217 See id. at 11, 14.
218 See id. at 15, 16.
219 MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 194, at 4.
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this backdrop of marital crisis, the marriage movement remains committed to the goal of helping 
more marriages succeed.221
C.  The Literature of the Marriage Movement
1.  The Mainstream Press
The most well known texts in the marriage movement are of course intended for a wide 
audience and written by authors who choose a conversational, journalistic writing style for ease 
of reading.  Both social historian Barbara Dafoe Whitehead’s and journalist Maggie Gallagher’s 
writings on marriage possess this appeal.  Whitehead’s essay Dan Quayle Was Right, published 
in the April 1993 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, placed her in the national spotlight.  She later 
expanded the ideas contained in the essay into the book The Divorce Culture.  Gallagher is best 
known for her provocative, early marriage-movement book Enemies of Eros and for her more 
recent collaborative effort The Case for Marriage.  
In Dan Quayle Was Right, Whitehead focuses squarely on the detrimental effects of 
familial disruption on children and society.  She concludes it is good for children to grow up in 
intact families where they live with both of their married biological parents and not as good if 
they grow up in disrupted families.  She premises her conclusion on the difference between 
“intact” and “disrupted” families.  Familial disruption encompasses the full range of 
circumstances under which a child is not raised by his or her married biological parents.  It 
includes not only the disintegration of a child’s biological parents’ marriage through separation 
or divorce, but also the fact of a child’s being born out of wedlock.  A child born to an unmarried 
committed couple also suffers disruption because of the risk that the cohabiting couple will break 
220 See id.
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up.  A child living in a stepparent family is a victim of familial disruption for the same reason.  
Even a single woman and the child she intentionally plans and prepares to have and to raise by 
herself are an example of a disrupted family, not so much because the child lacks an identifiable 
father, but because the child “must come to terms with [the mother’s] love life and romantic 
partners.”222  Whitehead equivocates on whether adopted children are victims of disruption, but 
the emphasis in her discussion on the value of the biological tie suggests that adopted children, 
too, are victims of familial disruption.  With the incidence of familial disruption on the rise, 
concludes Whitehead, too many children are growing up in circumstances that are not as good 
for them as growing up with their married biological parents.223
It is understandable that Whitehead’s article created the stir it did when it was published 
over ten years ago and that it continues to be cited in discussions of the marriage problem, 
particularly the “dilemma” of single motherhood.  A similar chord was struck by Maggie 
Gallagher’s Enemies of Eros five years earlier.  Through essays with titles such as Baby Lust, 
Mother Love; The Murder of Marriage; and Sex Acts Phil Donahue Never Taught You, 
Gallagher, a journalist, amazed readers with her sustained diatribe against the destabilizing 
effects of no-fault divorce and other ramifications of the rampant individualism that had
221 See STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 213, at 7.
222 Whitehead, Dan Quayle, supra note 203.
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 Whitehead’s most recent effort to tackle the marriage problem is an examination of 
professional women who want love, marriage, and commitment but who lack it in a divorce 
culture devoid of romance.  See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Why There Are No Good Men Left:  
The Romantic Plight of the New Single Woman (2003).  Whitehead describes the plight as 
follows:  (1) while pursuing their careers, women “hook up” for casual sex and delay 
relationships; (2) when their foothold in the career ladder is firm and they are ready for romance 
and marriage, they have very few available men to choose, and set their expectations are too 
high; (3) at that point in their lives, all they have left is a succession of commitment-phobic men 
who fail to live up to their expectations of being rescued by a knight in shining armor.  Id.
Whitehead then describes the “new courtship system” she discerns is emerging to help these 
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overtaken America.224  Punctuated by tragic stories of people whose lives have been forever 
damaged by these social phenomena, Enemies of Eros, highly acclaimed upon its publication, 
continues to be a wake-up call for a society hobbled by its own lack of respect for the public role 
of marriage.  
2.  Religious and Academic Perspectives
The marriage movement is not merely advanced by the mass-media contributions 
described above.  Able legal and social-science scholars have also contributed to the discussion.  
I group the academic and theosophist contributions to the marriage movement literature because 
of the large overlap between the two.  In general, academic writing within the marriage
movement is informed by a Christian-based approach to morality225 and is reflected in the 
longstanding collaboration between the Religion, Culture and the Family Project at the 
University of Chicago Divinity School and the National Marriage Project of Rutgers University.  
Professor Wardle, discussed above in Part II, is the leading legal academic figure in the 
marriage movement.  He believes the legal academy has erected a taboo against any public 
defense of heterosexuals-only marriage,226 and he hopes to enrich the resulting impoverished 
academic discourse by arguing not only that the Constitution guarantees no right to same-sex 
marriage227 but that legal recognition of same-sex marriage necessarily requires legal protection 
melancholy women find lasting love.  Id.
224 MAGGIE GALLAGHER, ENEMIES OF EROS:  HOW THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION IS KILLING FAMILY, 
MARRIAGE, AND SEX AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (1989).
225 See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 
1996 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 19 (noting that, in the period between 1990 and 1995, the sole “full” 
defense in American law reviews of heterosexuals-only marriage was on religious grounds).
226 See id. at 18, 22.  An issue of the Regent University Law Review seeks to combat the same 
taboo through its publication of articles on homosexuality.  See 14 REGENT UNIV. L. REV.
Number 2 (2002). 
227 See id. 28-58, 62-95.
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for socially objectionable practices such as polygamy, bigamy, and incest.228  In addition to 
fashioning legal arguments against same-sex marriage, Wardle also makes philosophical ones.  
He asserts, for example, that the essence of marriage is the blending of opposing sexual 
identities, something same-sex marriage cannot achieve.229
Those in agreement with Wardle have articulated similar arguments about the scope of 
the Constitution230 and the soundness of a heterosexuals-only definition of marriage.231  But 
Professors Collett and Wilkins see the essence of marriage slightly differently than does Wardle.  
Although Collett agrees with Wardle that the importance of marriage is that it is a “union of 
sexual difference,” she also emphasizes its potential to create new human life and in this way 
focuses more squarely on heterosexual sexual intercourse than does Wardle.232  Wilkins focuses 
solely on the sexual act:  the fundamental importance of heterosexual marriage is the 
reproductive look of heterosexual copulation, no matter the sterility of the participants or the 
228 See Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family:  A Critique of the American Law Institute’s 
“Domestic Partners” Proposal, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1189, 1201.
229 See Lynn D. Wardle, Marriage, Relationships, Same-Sex Unions, and the Right of Intimate 
Association, in MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE, at 190, 196 (Lynn D. Wardle, 
Mark Strasser, et al., eds. 2003) [hereinafter SAME-SEX UNIONS].  Cf. Katherine Shaw Spaht, 
Beyond Baehr:  Strengthening the Definition of Marriage, 12 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 277, 278, 285 
(1998) (“sexual complementarity”); Teresa Stanton Collett, Should Marriage Be Privileged?  
The State’s Interest in Childbearing Unions, in, SAME-SEX UNIONS, supra note 229, at 152, 157 
(defining marriage as a “union of sexual difference”) [hereinafter Collett, Privileged].  
230 See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Single- Sex “Marriage”:  The Role of the Courts, 2001 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1013 (vilifying the “activism” of courts that articulate constitutional rationales in support of 
same-sex marriage).
231 See, e.g., William C. Duncan, Whither Marriage in the Law?, 15 REGENT UNIV. L. REV. 119, 
125 (2002) (polygamy).
232 See Collett, supra note 229, at 157; see also Teresa Stanton Collett, Recognizing Same-Sex 
Marriage:  Asking for the Impossible?, 47 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 1245, 1249-50 (1998).  Wardle 
touches only briefly on the symbolic importance of heterosexual coitus in “Multiply and 
Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation,
24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 800 (2001) and in Image, Analysis, and the Nature of 
Relationships, in SAME-SEX UNIONS, supra note 229, at 115, 117.   
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contraception employed in the act.233  To Wilkins, a husband’s phallic penetration of his wife’s 
vagina is a potent symbol that transcends the actual fertility of individual married couples and 
channels and promotes responsible procreative behavior on a societal level.234  Indeed, because 
of its reproductive appearance, heterosexual coitus is the only sexual act by which two persons 
become one flesh.235 Both Collett and Wilkins emphasize that the sexual act must have 
reproductive potential, even if the participants are infertile,236 but they disagree on whether the 
choice to be infertile through contraception vitiates the purpose of marriage.237 Professor Robert 
George states that the act must be “reproductive in type.”238  No matter their disagreement on the 
status of different coital acts, these scholars believe the march of civilization has depended upon 
the enshrinement of this powerful symbol in the institution of marriage.  In their view, to open up 
the institution of marriage to participants who lack the capacity to engage in heterosexual coitus 
would threaten the very disintegration of civilization.   
Social science perspectives round out the academic work of the marriage movement.  The 
most prominent social scientist in the movement is undoubtedly Professor Linda J. Waite, a 
sociologist at the University of Chicago and co-author, with Maggie Gallagher, of The Case for 
Marriage.  Although not an academic monograph (Harvard University Press withdrew from the 
233
 Wilkins, The Constitutionality of Legal Preferences for Heterosexual Marriage, 16 REGENT 
UNIV. L. REV. 121 (2003).  Neither “reproductive potential” nor “reproductive in type” 
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234 Id. at 131.  
235 See id. 132.
236 See id.  Collett, Privileged, supra note 229, at 157.  
237 Cf. Wilkins, supra note 233, at 132 (no difference between use of contraception and 
infertility) with Collett, Recognizing, supra note 232, at 1261 (contraception vitiates marriage 
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project upon reviewing the manuscript),239 The Case for Marriage has been defended by Waite 
herself as similar in scholarly value to her other academic work.240  The book draws on a decade 
of research and begins with the premise that Americans have developed an ambivalence towards 
marriage, at once aspiring to it as an important, even sacred, step on the road to happiness and 
fulfillment but simultaneously suspecting it to be an arrangement in which the participants must 
abandon their cherished personal freedom.241  Generating the ambivalence are legal and 
demographic forces.  First, in developed nations, the agrarian economy of the pre-industrial age 
has given way to a postindustrial economy where marriage is less critical to human survival.242
Second, no-fault divorce has rendered marriage nothing more than any other unilaterally 
terminable “adult affair.”243  In short, marriage has become privatized, just one of many options 
for arranging intimate relationships.  
The result of these developments, according to Waite, is that marriage has lost its public
function of channeling people into new units of production in which they commit to creating 
goods for themselves, their children, and the rest of society.  In return, society agrees to 
238 See Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict:  Abortion and Homosexuality, 
106 YALE L.J. 2475, 2497 (1997).  
239
 The controversy surrounding Harvard’s decision is beyond the scope of this Article.  Waite 
and Gallagher comment on the controversy in an interview archived at
http://www.massnews.com/past_issues/2001/jan%202001/0101marriage3.htm.  
240 Id.
241 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 199, at 2-3, 34, 174.
242 See id. at 174.  Vanderbilt University Professor Virginia Abernethy made this same point 
almost thirty years ago, see Virginia D. Abernethy, American Marriage in Cross-Cultural 
Perspective, in CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE:  STRUCTURE, DYNAMICS, AND THERAPY 33, 38 
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243 Id. at 7.
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recognize, respect, and benefit the unit.244  The acknowledgment and support of this public role 
is critical to triggering marriage’s “unique power” to provide a better society for everyone.245
Whereas marriage has an important public function that must be reaffirmed, The Case for 
Marriage asserts that cohabitation does not.  As an arrangement easy to put on and then cast off, 
cohabitation lacks the type of permanent commitment we associate with marriage.  It is 
understandably appealing to those who desire above all to maintain their independence and not 
relinquish any personal freedom by bearing responsibility for another.  Without the “deeper 
partnership” of marriage, though, cohabitation neither promises nor offers the many private 
goods that marriage does.246
The bulk of The Case for Marriage, like Why Marriage Matters,247 is devoted to 
describing these many private goods.  Not only does the married couple benefit (better health, 
sex, and money), but so do their children (better health, education, and better prospects for 
happiness and prosperity going into adulthood).  The reader is then left to link these goods with 
the social goods described earlier.  On the topic of same-sex marriage, The Case for Marriage 
takes no explicit stand; the authors themselves cannot agree on its importance.248  The strong 
implication made by the book, however, aligns well with Whitehead’s view that children do best 
when raised in one household by their married biological parents.  As such, the book is most 
forcefully aimed at strengthening societal commitment to opposite-sex marriage,249 and so, 
unsurprisingly, no agenda for legislating same-sex marriage is included in the authors’ talking 
244 See id. at 17, 20-23.
245 Id. at 11, 17, 34
246 Id. at 45.
247 See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
248 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 199, at 200.
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points for “Renewing Marriage.”250 The Case for Marriage, then, provides no support for same-
sex marriage and offers many of the arguments against it made by other marriage-movement 
commentators.  
D.  Interpretive Problems of the Marriage Movement
The literature of the marriage movement conveys strong messages about the good of 
marriage, the danger to a society not adequately committed to marriage, and the need to
recommit to the idea of marriage.  Although couched in broad, encompassing language, and 
bolstered by appeals to the important role marriage has played throughout history, these claims 
are in fact much narrower than they appear, contain notions antithetical to the ethic of equality 
upon which our society is based, and use concerns about child welfare as a makeweight to 
support pleas for special benefits for married couples.    
1.  Narrow Claims
One of the problems with Whitehead’s analysis is that her definition of disruption is 
overinclusive.  For Whitehead, marriage between a child’s biological parents is itself the 
measure of “intactness” of families.  Other families are “disrupted” in some way, and, if not 
exactly doomed to lives of poverty and misery, are at least worse off than intact families.  But to 
describe a family headed by an unmarried committed couple as already disrupted because the 
couple is more likely to split up than is a married couple makes little sense.  Similarly, if as 
Whitehead claims, the tragedy of familial disruption is a child suffering the loss of a parent, it is 
unclear how the woman who plans and prepares to give birth to a child and to raise the child 
alone warrants characterization as disrupted or broken apart.  If families that are likely to self-
249 See id. at 188 (introducing talking points to “help more men and women succeed in . . . 
marriage”).
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destruct are “disrupted,” then so are married couples who as a class, according to Whitehead, are 
as likely to divorce as not.   Applied consistently, Whitehead’s amorphous definition of 
disruption swallows the category of intactness she sets out to defend.  
Although “intact” families are those that are best for children, it turns out that only “well 
functioning” intact families can truly meet children’s needs.  Indeed, in her recent testimony 
before a Congressional subcommittee discussing plans to bankroll marriage initiatives that would 
make the poor less dependent upon public subsidies, Whitehead praised low-conflict, long-
lasting marriages, stating that it was these marriages in particular that benefit adults, children, 
and society.  The categorical association of marriage with intactness, so prominent in Dan 
Quayle Was Right, was utterly missing.  With this new objective in mind, Whitehead urged 
Congress to strive to “reduce the barriers to healthy marriage.”  But beyond referring several 
times to how divorce harms children, she failed to suggest what barriers to good marriages 
Congress should help dismantle or how the proposed legislation would accomplish the task .  As 
a practical matter, Congress has little control over how easy it is to obtain a divorce, since 
divorce provisions are largely a matter of state, not federal, law.  Furthermore, the subcommittee 
that solicited her testimony was considering legislation not so much aimed at saving already 
contracted marriages but in promoting marriage among the not yet married.  
Finally, Whitehead and other marriage movement commentators give us no reason to 
believe that we are plagued not by a marriage problem but by a divorce problem.  Too much 
divorce does suggest that many heterosexual marriages are not the well functioning ones that 
benefit society.  Moreover, experts have made a convincing case that divorce affects children in 
insidious and devastating ways well into their adult lives.  But concern about divorce does not 
250 See id. at 200-01 (expressing ambivalence about same-sex marriage ).
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translate into the broad theory of family disruption Whitehead posits.  Many couples do not 
marry but do the hard work of maintaining a household and raising children.  They are as 
connected to expansive family and social networks as are many married couples and in some 
cases are more so.  Like married couples whose marriage functions well, these are not the 
couples who are contributing to a divorce culture that harms society.  Indeed, divorce may be a 
symptom of a marital family that never was intact to begin with.  Nonetheless, within 
Whitehead’s rubric, well functioning unmarried couples are disrupted, while even the most 
dysfunctional married couple is intact.   The flaws in Whitehead’s reasoning are themselves 
symptoms of the movement’s attempts to breathe new life into its cause by expanding the scope 
of the discussion from “the divorce problem” to “the marriage problem.”  But the shift in scope 
has brought with it many inconsistencies and contradictions.  Not surprisingly, then, the marriage 
movement has been largely unsuccessful in expanding its claims beyond its initial claim that the 
wide availability of no-fault divorce in this country has placed marriage (and by extension 
society) in crisis.251
Distilled to its essence, Whitehead’s thesis is difficult to assail:  divorce is a symptom of 
marital breakdown, and children do best when their parents have a well functioning relationship.  
While these ideas are simple and true, they are nonetheless much too narrow to support the grand 
claims about marriage Whitehead and other marriage-movement commentators have been 
making for well over a decade.  
2.  Equality Concerns
In addition to adopting narrow premises in its attempt to support broad, encompassing 
251 See, e.g., WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 199, at 76-85 (explaining the marriage crisis as a 
product of the divorce culture).
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assertions, the marriage movement betrays an unsettling commitment to a form of marriage 
marked by inequality.  While expressly rejecting the inequality model of marriage at every turn, 
the movement continues to champion the ability of marriage to contribute to economic 
prosperity.  The contradiction here lies in the fact that the form of marriage which contributes 
most to economic prosperity is laden with rigidly balkanized gender roles long decried from the 
highest levels of our judiciary as in conflict with our most cherished constitutional guarantees.  
Social historian John Demos’s account of marriage suggests that the ability of marriage 
to contribute to economic solidity lay in its strictly defined roles for men and women.  Building 
block idea is Women within this framework provided the sustenance, shelter, and sexual outlets 
men needed to restore themselves for renewed forays into the marketplace.  These ideas recall 
the marriage movement’s insistence that marriage is the building block of society, a notion 
probably linked to the important organizing and subsistence functions that marriage formerly 
fulfilled but which have fallen away in our age.252  This historical form of marriage has been 
described as a tool for the political and economic subjugation of women, an oppression of long 
duration in which the law continues to be complicit.253  In particular, Professor Martha Fineman 
has developed an intricate and compelling theory positing that within rhetoric about the 
importance of marriage to society lies the privatization of dependency on a grand scale.254
According to this theory, this rhetoric masks the traditional nuclear family’s true function in 
252 See Abernethy, supra note 242, at 39.  
253 See COTT, supra note 182, at 62-67; Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should 
Read Martha Fineman, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 167, 169-70 (1999) (cataloguing 
inequities); Dianne Post, Why Marriage Should Be Abolished, 18 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 283, 
289-306 (1997) (associating marriage with slavery and involuntary servitude); Regan, supra note 
70, at 649-50 (cataloguing inequities).
254
 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution:  The Ideal of the Family in American 
Law and Society, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 387, 400.  
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serving as a locus for inevitable and derivative dependency.255  With the onslaught of marital 
breakdown, Fineman urges that marriage is no longer capable of fulfilling this role and advocates 
its abolition as a legal category.256  To replace marriage, Fineman advocates a re-envisioned 
family focusing on the mother-and-child caretaking relationship as the core unit of family 
intimacy.257
The marriage movement purports to reject the inequality model of marriage so vividly 
explicated by Demos and Fineman and to refashion it into an equal partnership where both 
spouses bear responsibility for breadwinning, housekeeping and child rearing.  Such shared roles 
of course create an increased demand for third-party childcare, which commentators in the 
marriage movement criticize as detrimental to children.258  While creating more financial wealth 
for individual couples, these shared roles also create inflationary pressure, which can lead to 
more time spent working and less time in the home.  Faced with this inconsistency, other 
marriage-movement commentators make clear that the equal-partners-in-marriage model is not a 
desirable way to place marriage back on solid footing, or at least should not be an overriding 
concern.  One view posits that a culture committed to children cannot be fixated on equality and 
255 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 89, 92 (1998); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency:  The 
Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2200, 2205 (1995).  
256 See FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES 164, 228 (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER]; Jeffrey Evans Stake, 
Michael Grossberg, Martha Fineman, Akhil Reed Amar, Regina Austin, & Thomas S. Ulen, 
Roundtable:  Opportunities for and Limitations of Private Ordering in Family Law, 73 IND. L.J.
535, 542 (1998) (“Marriage is no longer able to serve its historic role as the repository for 
dependency.”).  
257 See FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 256, at 228, 230-32.
258 See F. Carolyn Graglia, The Housewife as Pariah, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 515 
(1995) (referring to “the vagaries of surrogate care”) [hereinafter Graglia, Housewife]. 
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autonomy but upon dependence and obligation.259 Another view posits that role sharing in 
marriage is too dangerously “androgynous”260 and robs of a marriage of the opposing forces that 
generate the sexual desire so essential to conjugal fidelity.  The debate continues.  No consensus 
has yet emerged from the marriage movement as to how, in reinvigorating marriage, we can 
avoid resurrecting long-rejected gender-based inequities.  
The marriage movement recognizes its dilemma:  the goals it claims marriage achieves 
cannot be satisfied without returning to anachronistic roles in marriage, but extolling such 
marriages would cause the movement to lose coveted political ground.  For the time being, the 
movement is forced to proclaim its commitment to equality in marriage in the vaguest of terms, 
without acknowledging that such a commitment contradicts many of its most adamantly held 
positions.   
3.  Inadequate Concern for Child Welfare
Much of the marriage movement’s efforts to promote marriage is actually detrimental to 
children.  In Focus on the Family’s latest effort in support of the Federal Marriage Amendment
to outlaw same-sex marriage, a forlorn young boy stares out from a newspaper advertisement 
and asks, “Why don’t [certain senators] believe every child needs a mother and a father?”  A 
warning follows: “Homosexual marriage intentionally creates fatherless families or motherless 
families.  Think about it.” The advertisement is but one example of how the marriage movement 
uses images of suffering children in its quest to engrave a heterosexual definition of marriage on 
the Constitution.  The advertisement tells readers that not supporting the Marriage Amendment 
259 See Maggie Gallagher, A Reality Waiting to Happen:  A Response to Evan Wolfson, in SAME-
SEX UNIONS, supra note 229, at 12.
260 See Graglia, Non-Feminist, supra note 71, at 995, 996, 1002; see also Graglia, Housewife, 
supra note 258, at 515. 
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will deprive children of a mother and a father.  But in the telling, the advertisement misassociates 
marriage with parenthood in a rhetorical tactic that has become the trademark of the 
heterosexuals-only marriage movement. 
Little of substance lies behind the appeals to children’s welfare in the campaign to outlaw 
same-sex marriage.  At its website, Focus on the Family warns readers that same- sex marriage 
will “rip kids apart emotionally.”  The argument proceeds as follows: unmarried people have too 
much sex with too many partners, and individual gays and lesbians are the worst offenders, 
typically tallying a thousand or more sexual partners over a lifetime.  That’s not good for 
children.  What’s more, in the wake of the rising divorce rate among heterosexuals, blended 
families and shared-custody arrangements that confuse children have mushroomed.  While this 
parade of horribles might support arguments for planned parenthood or pre- and post-marital 
counseling, it has nothing to do with same-sex marriage or its effect on kids’ emotional lives.  
The website offers clarification: “More than ten thousand studies have concluded that children 
do best when they are raised by loving and committed mothers and fathers.”  But this 
declaration, recalling our discussion of Whitehead, supra, merely restates a well known truism 
that has nothing to do with marriage.  That children do best when raised by good parents who 
function well together is not the least bit controversial, but it happens also not to support a call 
for heterosexuals-only marriage.  Underneath both Focus on the Family’s and Whitehead’s calls 
for marriage reform is a simple message that children suffer without love and support and that 
love and support may diminish when parents are distracted by the basic struggle to get along.  
Using this message about child welfare as a way of promoting a ban on same-sex marriage at 
best seems counterintuitive:  the ban will not guarantee love and support even for children who 
live together with their married heterosexual parents, and it will do nothing to assuage the 
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ravages of divorce.  Moreover, if the married family is a locus in which children thrive, we 
should do what we can to promote more marriage, not less.   
Efforts to outlaw same-sex marriage, if successful, are destined to harm certain children.  
Part of the objection to same-sex marriage is that it would allow married gay and lesbian couples 
to adopt each other’s children under stepparent adoption statutes.  Such adoptions would give the 
children of same-sex couples all the legal protections and benefits of having two parents, one of 
the primary goals of parentage law.261 As explained above in Part II, children of assisted 
reproduction, who in some cases have only one legal parent and a second functional parent they 
have known since birth, would benefit the most.  Recognizing this fact, the marriage movement 
must nonetheless believe that the welfare of these children is the cost required to protect 
opposite-sex marriage with a constitutionally enshrined ban on its same-sex equivalent.  In the 
end, however, the argument that privileging heterosexual marriage is critical to ensuring the 
welfare of children falls apart when it comes to light that some children will actually suffer under 
such a myopic and rigidly exclusionary view of the value of marriage.  
CONCLUSION
Restrictions on adoption and assisted reproduction exist in various forms.  Restrictions 
based on marital status are particularly prevalent and intractable.  Whereas the emphasis on 
marriage has fallen away from the regulation of artificial insemination, and whereas single 
persons are universally permitted to adopt children (albeit not on equal footing with married 
couples), new proposals to regulate surrogacy invariably restrict the use of surrogacy to married 
couples.  Such restrictions, viewed under an interpretive microscope, fail to achieve the  
261 See Garrison, supra note 24, at __.
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minimum standard of consistency and neutrality to which our system of justice adheres.  
Furthermore, particularly in adoption, favoritism toward married couples can render some 
children unadoptable, an outcome that seems particularly draconian and lacking in integrity.  
Given that marriage has for millennia been an important presence in societies throughout 
the world, the belief that the world would be unrecognizable in its present form without it is 
completely understandable.  The marriage movement has for over a decade worked strenuously 
to reverse what it sees as a societal decline produced by the divorce culture.  To its credit, the 
movement seems genuinely concerned with engineering a safer, more salutary society for all.  Its 
efforts, however, harbor certain alarming traits.  Not only do they appear to be unrelated to any 
serious consideration of child welfare, but they might well require a return to a form of marriage 
that has been discredited as inimical to the equality guarantees of our constitutional system.  
Under close scrutiny, the broad, encompassing claims of the marriage movement reduce to a 
narrow and uncontroversial truism: children do best when they are raised by loving and 
supportive parents.  Were this truism to be implemented to the fullest extent, marital restrictions 
on adoption and assisted reproduction would be abolished.  
